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DISCOVERY ALONG THE LITIGATION/SCIENCE
INTERFACE
Richard L. Marcus*
Science was done in the open, that was a reason it had conquered; if it
dwindled away into little secret groups hoarding their results away
from each other, it would become no better than a set of recipes, and
within a generation would have lost all its ideals and half its efficacy.
C.P. Snow'
[The scientific method and the adversary system are polar opposites.
Peter Huber2
Involvement with attorneys in litigation interferes with the scientist's
primary activities; demands a substantial investment of energy and
time (usually at the scientist's inconvenience); requires a degree of
commitment that is disproportionate to any professional or monetary
return; always involves the risk of being made to appear foolish, su-
perficial or incompetent; and the conflict and contention involved in
legal actions can be extremely unpleasant.
Two scientists, addressing scientific meeting5
Snow's vision of science has sustained not only scientists
but Western society since the Industrial Revolution-hence the
notion that science has conquered. As we approach the twenty-
first century with a greater emphasis on technology, this vision
* Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of the Law. I am in-
debted to my colleague David Faigman for comments on an earlier draft, and to Eliza-
beth Johnsen, Hastings class of 1991, and Amy Landers, Hastings class of 1993, for re-
search assistance on this article. Each of them disagreed with me on some points, and
they bear no responsibility for my persistence in these points. Copyright 0 1991, Richard
L. Marcus.
1 C.?. SNow, THE NEW Msx' 130 (1954).
2 Huber, A Comment on: Toward Incentive-Based Procedure: Three Approaches for
Regulating Scientific Evidence by E. Donald Eliott, 69 B.U.L. Rnv. 513, 513 (1989). Peter
Huber has emerged as one of the leading critics of the tort system in general, and of the
handling of scientific issues in court in particular. See, e.g., P. Hutnma Lmmr: THE
LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES (1988); Huber, Junk Science and the Jury,
1991 U. CHL LEGAL F. 273.
3 Lloyd & Auxier, How Science Can Contribute to the Legal Process, 58 HEALTH
PHsics 929, 929 (1989). This article was presented at the 114th annual meeting of the
American Public Health Association. Id. at 929 n.*.
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is likely to seem more central. While science has been riding
high as a symbol of the success of Western society, American
litigation has in many quarters come to represent a failure.
Where litigation has conquered, this feat is widely viewed as a
bad thing. Suspicion of the litigation process seems particularly
pronounced in the scientific community. In large measure, this
suspicion is due to what scientists take to be the perversion of
science in litigation, reflected in Huber's characterization of the
two as "polar opposites." This suspicion is compounded by the
unpleasantness of litigation described by the two scientists ad-
dressing their assembled brethren.
Despite Snow's devotion to openness, science today often
views requests for information for use in litigation with extreme
resentment. Given the prominence of scientific theory and scien-
tific findings in certain types of civil litigation-particularly in
the growing field of toxic torts-it is understandable that liti-
gants will try to subpoena pertinent data from scientists.
Equally understandably, scientists will resist subpoenas in some
instances and, like other professionals, claim that they should be
privileged to refuse to comply with discovery.4 At that point, the
courts will be called upon to mediate.
The Second Circuit confronted a heated conflict between a
researcher and litigants in Application of American Tobacco
Co.5 Several tobacco companies were sued by asbestos workers
suffering from lung cancer. The plaintiffs had been smokers as
well as asbestos workers, and they claimed that the tobacco com-
panies were liable for failing to warn them of the peculiar risks
of smoking for asbestos workers. They were expected to rely at
trial on the research of a prominent professor at New York's Mt.
Sinai School of Medicine, who had published several pathbreak-
ing studies concluding that the synergy between exposure to as-
bestos and smoking produced a geometrical increase in the fre-
quency of lung cancer. The researcher and the school moved to
quash the subpoena on the ground that they should be protected
' See Krattenmaker, Testimonial Privileges in Federal Courts: An Alternative to
the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, 62 GEo. L.J. 61, 85 (1973) ("Perhaps the major-
ity of evidence experts... [believe] that testimonial privileges are .. born of competing
professional jealousies . ").
1 880 F.2d 1520 (2d Cir. 1989) (before Lumbard, Feinberg and Kearse, JJ.; opinion
per Kearse, J.).
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by a researcher's privilege." The district court enforced the sub-
poena. The Second Circuit upheld the district court but, as it
had in 1984 7skirted the question whether there should be a re-
searcher's privilege.
This Article examines the problem of accommodating the
concerns of science and the needs of litigations in the discovery
context. This analysis is particularly timely given the recent
amendment to Rule 45 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
to provide explicit recognition of the interests of nonparty ex-
perts who are subpoenaed.' The tensions involved can be illus-
trated with two overdrawn scenarios:
Scenario A: Humanitarian Pharmaceutical Co., the maker
of pharmaceutical Y, is sued by a plaintiff who claims to have
contracted cancer from taking the drug. At trial, plaintiff's ex-
pert witness, Dr. Crackpot, tells the jury that, based on studies
done by other scientists, it is her conclusion to a reasonable
medical, certainty that plaintiff's cancer was caused by pharma-
ceutical Y. Despite the testimony of defendant's experts, who
present the generally accepted view of the scientific community
that there is no connection, the jury returns a verdict of $10 mil-
lion for plaintiff.
Scenario B: After years of patient and inspired effort to de-
velop population studies on the effects of exposure to chemical
X, Dr. Humanitarian is nearing completion of the studies and
anticipates being able to demonstrate that chemical X causes
6 They also argued that the subpoena was unduly burdensome and objected to it on
a variety of other grounds, which are considered below.
See In re Grand Jury Subpoena Dated Jan. 4, 1984, 750 F.2d 223 (2d Cir. 1984).
8 The focus of this Article is on civil litigation, where the type of sciencellitigation
controversies being examined are likely to occur. In relation to privilege claims, note that
"[i]n a criminal case, the need for relevant evidence will weigh much more heavily on the
scales than in a civil case." 2 J. WEwsm'iN & M. BERra, WmNsTmN's EvmE.Nca S
501[03], at 501-41 (1991).
9 This amendment, promulgated by the Supreme Court on April 30, 1991, will be-
come effective on December 1, 1991, unless Congress acts to the contrary. As of this
writing, it appears Congress will not take such action. As amended, Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 45(c)(3)(B)(ii) will provide that a subpoena may be quashed if it "requires
disclosure of an unretained expert's opinion or information not describing specific events
or occurrences in dispute and resulting from the expert's study made not at the request
of any party ..... Note that one might contend that even where the researcher's con-
clusions will be before the court the underlying data are not discoverable under this new
provision. However, it seems too great a stretch to conclude that to be discoverable in
such circumstances the underlying data must "decrib[e specific events or occurrences
in dispute."
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cancer. On the eve of this breakthrough, however, her research
efforts are disrupted by a subpoena from Oligopoly Chemical
Co., the maker of chemical X, which has been sued by a plaintiff
claiming that exposure to the chemical has caused plaintiff's
cancer.
The Article begins with background on the general tension
between science and litigation by exploring the mistrust that is
caricatured in Scenario A, concluding that although science is
methodologically different from litigation it is unlikely soon to
be insulated from litigation. Thus, litigants will continue to
make discovery requests for research data. Accordingly, the Arti-
cle examines the risks caricatured in Scenario B and the ways in
which the court system has responded to those concerns. It con-
cludes that a qualified privilege is not warranted and that a bet-
ter (though similar) approach to the risks posed by Scenario B
can be crafted based on the federal rules governing discovery.
The Article closes with an examination of the factors that
should bear on such decisions, providing a context for applica-
tion of amended Rule 45.
I. THE LITIGATION/SCIENCE INTERFACE
As Huber tersely observes, there seems to be an inherent
tension between science and litigation. Some years ago Profes-
sors Thibaut and Walker expanded upon this topic as a preface
to their theory favoring adversarial procedures for resolving dis-
putes in court:
Disputes that develop in scientific inquiry are the prototype of
cognitive conflict in a setting of common interest. Scientists are social-
ized in an ethic of disinterestedness in the pursuit of widening and
deepening their commonly held store of knowledge and understand-
ing. This ethic serves to suppress conflicts of personal or material in-
terest in furtherance of a common stake in the scientific enterprise. In
principle, as long as scientists adhere to this idealized role, their con-
flicts are purely cognitive; competing hypotheses are entertained for
the purpose of ascertaining the truth. Typically, in "normal" science,
the validity or relative adequacy of rival hypotheses is determined by
submitting the question at issue to empirical or formal tests by exper-
iment or mathematical analysis.
At the other extreme of the subject matter continuum is the situ-
ation of maximum conflict of interest. In this case the respective in-
terests of the parties are perfectly opposed because a particular solu-
tion will maximize the outcome of one of the parties only at the
expense of the other. Here the ultimate test of any particular solution
[Vol. 57:381
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is the character of the distribution of outcomes among the interested
parties, and no solution will ultimately be recognized as "correct" by
all of them. Hence, the objective of resolving conflicts of interest must
frankly be seen as something other than finding the "true" or scientif-
ically valid result. From the time of Aristotle the objective in resolving
this kind of dispute has been characterized as "justice."10
Professors Thibaut and Walker proceeded from this analy-
sis to explore the choice between inquisitorial and adversary
methods of resolving disputes, concluding that for scientific cog-
nitive disputes some variant of an inquisitorial autocratic
method might be best, but that for the distributive questions
brought before courts the adversarial method, with its active in-
volvement of the parties, is superior. Based on the work of Thi-
baut and Walker, researchers of the "procedural justice" school
have examined the ways in which our age-old commitment to
the adversarial system serves to promote satisfaction with out-
comes in court.1 Nevertheless, the question whether the adver-
sary system's benefits outweigh its costs remains, as it should, a
hotly debated topic.12
Without trying to sort out that debate at present, it can be
said without doubt that the adversary system does not produce
satisfaction among scientists when issues of science are
presented in court. Scientists are committed to the scientific
ideal, in which practitioners of the scientific method assiduously
seek to garner information about the true state of affairs in na-
ture. This quest involves experimental evaluations of hypotheses
10 Thibaut & Walker, A Theory of Procedure, 66 CALIF. L. REv. 541, 543-44 (1978);
see also Goldberg, The Reluctant Embrace: Law and Science in America, 75 GEo. LJ.
1341, 1345 (1987) ("Rather than seeking greater knowledge of the natural world, the law
seeks the peaceful resolution of human disputes.").
Thibaut and Walker's image of scientists, though widely shared and assiduously cul-
tivated by scientists, is not universally held. Paul Feyerabend, for example, takes an
iconoclastic view that science is an ideology, completely shaped at any moment in time
by its historical and cultural context. In his view, scientific disputes are resolved not on
their merits but by the theatrical and oratorical skills of their advocates, much as are
legal cases. See, e.g., P. FE imNO, AGAINST MTHOD (1975). He also takes comfort in
the fact that "[l]awyers show again and again that an expert does not know what he is
talking about." Id. at 307. While recognizing this dichotomy of views on the scientific
method, for purposes of this Article, we may begin by accepting the outlook described by
Thibaut and Walker.
"I See, e.g., A. LInD & T. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDUnAL JUSTICE
(1988).
See, e.g., S. LANDSMAN, READINGS ON ADVESAsIL JuscEn THE Amsmc c AP-
PROACH To ADxuDIcATION (1980).
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that incrementally build upon the scientific work of others to-
ward greater insights. The bywords are objectivity and caution;
whenever possible investigators should be protected from the
risks of bias in their observations. Experimental results should
be peer-reviewed by others schooled in the discipline before
publication.1 3 Published results should be verifiable by replica-
tion; if they are not verified the conclusions are called into ques-
tion.14 This is the ideal held up by C.P. Snow, and it retains its
force today.
To the pursuers of this ideal, the reality of litigation over
issues investigated by science is disquieting and sometimes out-
right embarrassing. Lawyers themselves usually lack meaningful
training in science. 15 These lawyers hire witnesses with scientific
credentials to present scientific theories helpful to the lawyers'
clients. Those theories need not have been published or sub-
jected to peer review, and the scientific credentials of the wit-
nesses may be rather thin. Indeed, some suggest that in litiga-
tion there is a sort of Gresham's Law by which marginal science
thrives at the expense of good science because it offers the pros-
pect of greater profits in court.1 ' This use of expert witnesses
may also be highly profitable to the witnesses themselves and
even more so to those who traffic in expert witnesses.17
At trial these hired gun experts propound their marginal
theories before jurors who are likely to lack significant under-
standing of basic scientific principles s and who may accordingly
's See, e.g., Monahan & Walker, Social Authority: Obtaining, Evaluating, and Es-
tablishing Social Science in Law, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 500 (1986).
2' See, e.g., Faigman, To Have and Have Not: Assessing the Value of Social Science
to the Law as Science and Policy, 38 EMORY L.J. 1005, 1016-21 (1989).
16 The growing exception to this rule is the recent tendency of patent firms to hire
scientists to assist in handling the complex issues presented by patent cases. In some
instances, the firms send the scientists to law school. See London, New Technology
Sends Law Firms Recruiting Scientists To Be Partners, N.Y. Times, Mar. 22, 1991, at
B18, col. 3.
16 E.g., Elliott, Toward Incentive-Based Procedure: Three Approaches for Regulat-
ing Scientific Evidence, 69 B.U.L. REV. 487, 492 (1989) ("our current system of litigation
creates strong incentives for lawyers to select experts with views outside the mainstream
of scientific opinion").
17 See Richards, Doctors Seek Crackdown on Colleagues Paid For Testimony in
Malpractice Suits, Wall. St. J., Nov. 7, 1988, at B1, col. 3 (noting that "brokers" for
expert witnesses in malpractice cases are paid 20-30% of the total recovery in some
instances).
18 See Huber, Junk Science and the Jury, supra note 2.
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be moved more by the cinematic qualities of the witnesses than
the technical force of their testimony. The jurors may even dis-
count the testimony of the expert witnesses altogether on the
ground that they are hired guns.
Although this dismal portrait is overdrawn, it can easily be
supported with illustrations from real litigation life. Little won-
der, then, that many scientists view litigation regarding scientific
matters with dismay and seek to keep their dignified distance.
To take a prominent, recent example that might be a paradigm
for Scenario A, consider the spate of personal injury claims for
alleged injuries suffered in utero due to exposure to the anti-
nausea drug Bendectin. Evidently in part because litigation was
pending,19 a great deal of scientific investigation was done on the
possible link between Bendectin and fetal mutations. The con-
sensus of the scientific community, on the basis of this work, was
that no such link could be established. Nevertheless, Bendectin
was removed from the market and, as a recent scientific editorial
lamented, "the Bendectin cases go on, in spite of what appears
to be better evidence for safety than is available for any other
substance, including tap water. ' 20 Surely this has been a dis-
couraging episode for scientists.
A commonly proposed solution among scientists for such
embarrassing misadventures in litigation is to take science out of
the courtroom altogether. The idea is not to deem scientific
principles unimportant in the resolution of litigated disputes but
to leave their resolution to scientists rather than the hurly-burly
of the courtroom, indeed to supplant the adversary method with
something more like the refereed approach of true science. One
such solution would be to create a sort of "science court" to pass
on issues of science.21 At least in the personal injury area, the
idea of exporting issues of science out of the courtroom has gar-
nered significant support in the legal community.22 Some go fur-
ther and urge that all issues regarding the safety of new technol-
19 See note 124 and accompanying text infra.
20 Scialli, Bendectin, Science, and the Law, 3 REPRODUCnUY TOXICOLOGY 157, 157
(1989).
21 E.g., Martin, The Proposed "Science Court," 75 Mic. L REv. 1058 (1977)
(describing proposals to create a science court to resolve issues of science and technology
for public policymakers).
12 See, e.g., Sugarman, The Need to Reform Personal Injury Low: Leauing Scien-
tific Disputes to Scientists, 248 SCMaNCE 823 (1990).
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ogy be removed from the courts and assigned to technocrats who
could license innovations found to be safe enough, thereby insu-
lating against liability for resulting injuries. 23
These proposals would obviously be stiff medicine. They cut
to the core of the Anglo-American tradition of trial and raise
fundamental issues that make their implementation in the near
future improbable. Indeed, so embedded is the notion of the ad-
versarial process that, when a "science court" was proposed to
resolve issues of science for Congress or the Executive Branch,
one of its selling points was that it would involve adversary
processes.24 Abandonment of the adversary method for key is-
sues involved in litigation is probably not on the horizon.
Moreover, a fair evaluation of science's claim of exemption
from the courtroom calls for mention of some reasons for skepti-
cism about leaving science solely to scientists when the resolu-
tion of civil disputes is in question. Despite its shining ideals,
science itself is not untarnished. Fraud in science is a problem
that has been around for a long time,25 and legitimate concerns
about it remain. To take a recent, highly publicized example,
Nobel Prize winner David Baltimore had to withdraw a paper
owing to the revelation that some of the data on which it was
based had apparently been faked. 20 To deal with concerns about
;3 See Huber, Safety and the Second Best: The Hazards of Public Risk Manage-
ment in the Courts, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 277 (1985). For criticism of this approach, see
Marcus, Book Review, Apocalypse Now?, 85 MICH. L. REv. 1267, 1278-81 (1987).
2 Martin, supra note 21, at 1058. Professor Martin suggested that "the adversarial
process, which is central to the trial process in the common law system, holds promise
for supplying provisional answers to scientific questions that must be answered before
policy may be set." Id. He added that "the use of adversaries has great promise in bring.
ing issues quickly to a head. Nothing in the scientific method guarantees that hypotheses
will be tested or when they will be tested, while the adversary process usually guarantees
that all points of an opposing position will be raised and decided within the time limits
of the litigation." Id. at 1064. It must be noted, of course, that Professor Martin was
trained as a lawyer, not a scientist, and that he taught in a law school.
20 See W. BROAD & N. WADE, BETRAYERS OF THE TRUTH 22-37 (1982) (detailing seem-
ing misconduct by scientists including Ptolemy, Galileo and Newton); A. KOHN, FALSn
PROPHRTs: FRAuD AND ERROR IN SCIENCE AND MEDICINE 35-45 (1986) (similarly question-
ing work of Ptolemy, Newton and Mendel).
28 Hilts, Crucial Data Were Fabricated in Report Signed by Top Biologist, N.Y.
Times, Mar. 21, 1991, at Al, col. 1 (17 pages of notebook data were seemingly faked),
The scientist against whom the charges were leveled has denied them, although she does
admit that there were false statements in the paper and that they should have been
corrected. See Hilts, "I am innocent," Embattled Biologist Says, N.Y. Times, June 4,
1991, at B5, col. 1. Dr. Baltimore, meanwhile, resigned from his post as President of
Rockefeller University because the scientific fraud controversy "'created a climate of
[Vol. 57:381
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fraud in science, the National Institutes of Health (N.I.H.) have
set up an Office of Scientific Integrity, dubbed by some the "sci-
ence police. '27 Congress itself has recently held hearings on the
problem of improper scientific research, stressing issues of self-
interest as well as self-promotion.28
One answer to these concerns is that science will unfoul its
own nest by unmasking those who do false science. The Balti-
more case at least raises questions about that argument. The
junior researcher who unearthed that fraud was fired and ban-
ished from science for some years for her troubles.20 Rather than
take her questions seriously, many scientists closed ranks in de-
fense of the published paper. As another scientist put it, many
"were willing to go to battle with absolute certainty, without
bothering to read the paper and think about the likelihood that
the paper was wrong."' 30
While the Baltimore case may have been an isolated inci-
dent, it is impossible to determine whether there are many such
problems hidden in the annals of modern science.31 This and
unhappiness among some in the university that could not be dispelled."' Hilts, Nobelist
Entangled in Fraud Case Resigns as Head of Rockefeller U., N.Y. Times, Dec. 3, 1991,
at Al, col 1. (quoting Dr. Baltimore's letter of resignation).
27 See Leary, On the Trail of Research Misconduct; Science Police Take the Lime-
light, N.Y. Times, Mar. 25, 1991, at A13, col 1. But a district judge has recently held
that these N.LH. investigations rules violate the Federal Administrative Procedures Act.
Abbs v. Sullivan, 756 F. Supp. 1172 (W.D. Wis. 1990). See London, Judge Voids Rules
on Scientific Fraud Inquiries, N.Y. Times, May 3, 1991, at Bl, col 1.
More ominously, controversy surrounds the Office of Scientific Integrity. The head
of the N.I.H. has forced the agency's chief fraud investigator to resign and has recused
herself from any future investigations of alleged scientific misconduct. Representative
John Dingell (D. Mich.), chair of a subcommittee inquiring into these matters, expressed
concern that "there is an attempt at N.I.H. to dismantle the Office of Scientific Integrity
. . . ." See Hilts, Scientist Withdrawing from Misconduct Cases, N.Y. Times, Aug. 1,
1991, at A14, col 1. Some see these developments as raising serious questions about
whether scientists can seriously investigate and resolve matters of scientific misconduct.
See id.
I See HOUSE CoMMs ON Gov'T OPERATIONS, An ScImNTIc MscoNDucT AND Con-
FLICTS OF INTEREsT HAzARDous TO OuR HEALTH?, HI.R. REP. No. 688, 101st Cong., 2d Sem.
(1990).
19 See Hilts, Biologist Who Disputed a Study Paid Dearly, N.Y. Times, Mar. 22,
1991, at Al, coL 2.
30 Id. at A12 (quoting Dr. Mark Ptaschne of Harvard University).
31 Some guess that there are many instances of fraud in science. Broad and Wade
estimate that "for every case of major fraud that comes to light, a hundred or so go
undetected," and they extrapolate that "every major case of fraud that becomes public is
the representative of some 100.000 others, major and minor combined, that lie concealed
in the marshy wastes of the scientific literature." W. BROAD & N. WADE, supra note 25, at
87.
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other revelations of scientific fraud"2 blunt momentum for the
sort of radical change mentioned above. Instead, courts seem in-
creasingly willing to rely upon more vigorous scrutiny of the va-
lidity and reliability of scientific testimony."3 This sort of screen-
ing to weed out clearly bad science has been endorsed in the
scientific community, which would prefer that the standards of
science be applied to screen evidence in court.3 4 As Judge Wein-
stein has put it, "when either the expert's qualifications or his
testimony lie at the periphery of what the scientific community
considers acceptable, special care should be exercised in evaluat-
ing the reliability and probative worth of the proferred
testimony."3 5
Here again, Bendectin provides a useful example. In a lead-
ing case, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia up-
held a J.N.O.V. for, the defendant in a Bendectin case despite
expert testimony that exposure to the drug had caused plain-
tiffs injuries. Noting that the question of causation is "scientific
in nature," the court found that "it is to the scientific commu-
', See HR REP. No. 688, supra note 28, at 10-50 (detailing ten instances of recent
fraud in science).
33 This tendency may be accelerated if a recently proposed amendment to Federal
Rule of Evidence 702 is adopted. See Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Federal Rules of Evidence, 137 F.R.D. 53, 156-58
(1991). The amendment directs that expert testimony should be allowed only if "the
information is reasonably reliable," will "substantially" assist the trier of fact, and the
expert demonstrates proper training to provide the testimony. Id. at 156. Although the
amendment is not a return to the "general acceptance" standard of Frye v. United
States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923), the advisory committee notes indicate that "the
court is called upon to reject testimony that is based upon premises lacking any signifi-
cant support and acceptance within the scientific community .... ." Id. at 157. This
proposal has not been endorsed by the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and
Procedure, much less the Supreme Court. The earliest date on which it might become
effective if adopted would be December 1, 1993.
Certainly there are some unduly rigid limitations on expert testimony. See, e.g.,
Ralph v. Nagy, 749 F. Supp. 169 (M.D. Tenn. 1990), in which the court held that a
Tennessee state statute limiting expert witnesses from the health care field to those li-
censed in Tennessee or contiguous states applied in federal court, and that two New
York doctors therefore could not testify for plaintiff.
34 See, e.g., Brent, Improving the Quality of Expert Witness Testimony, 39 TERA-
TOLOGY 215 (1989); Muscat & Huncharek, Causation and Disease: Biomedical Science in
Toxic Tort Litigation, 31 J. OCCUPATIONAL Mnv. 997 (1989).
85 In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1223, 1242 (E.D.N.Y. 1985),
aff'd, 818 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied sub nom. Lombardi v. Dow Chemical Co.
487 U.S. 1234 (1988).
[Vol. 57: 381
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nity that the law must look for the answer."36 Looking to sci-
ence, the court rejected the testimony of the plaintiff's expert:
"Uniquely in this case, the law now has the benefit of twenty
years of scientific study, and the published results must be given
their just due. '3 7 The Fifth Circuit has similarly ruled that ab-
sent statistically significant epidemiological proof that Bendec-
tin causes birth defects, a plaintiffs proposed proof that the
drug caused her birth defects is insufficient to get to the jury38
But this trend toward more exacting scrutiny of scientific
evidence before it is admitted in court stops well short of what
scientists would probably prefer. Some courts even continue to
allow Bendectin cases to go to juries.3 9 Moreover, even if they
are not an exception that proves the rule that junk science still
can find a place in the courtroom, Bendectin cases seem to oc-
cupy a special shelf in the litigation/science arena. For instance,
a panel of the Fifth Circuit has maintained that proof of causa-
tion ordinarily need not depend upon epidemiological studies
and that its insistence on such proof in Bendectin cases is "[t]he
exception from this rule."4 On the other hand, that court's en
banc endorsement of critical scrutiny of the expert's "methodol-
ogy" in the same case may fuel moves toward an approach that
could please the scientists.41
36 Richardson v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 857 F.2d 823, 829 (D.C. Cir. 1988), cert.
denied, 493 U.S. 882 (1989).
Id. at 832.
I Brock v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 884 F.2d 166 (5th Cir. 1989), modify-
ing 874 F.2d 307 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1511 (1990).
" E.g., DeLuca v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 911 F.2d 941, 952 (3d Cir.
1990) ("[W]e do not have the authority to create special rules to address the problems
posed by continued Bendectin litigation."); Longmore v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,
Inc., 737 F. Supp. 1117 (D. Idaho 1990).
40 Christophersen v. Allied-Signal Corp., 902 F.2d 362, 367 (5th Cir. 1990), vacated,
939 F.2d 1106 (5th Cir. 1991) (en banc); see also Graham v. Wyeth Laboratories, 906
F.2d 1399, 1407-08 (10th Cir.), cert. denied sub noa. Wyeth-Ayers Labs Div. of Am.
Home Prods. Corp. v. Graham, 111 S. Ct. 511 (1990) (error to exclude defendant's ex-
pert's testimony on causation on ground that expert was not familiar with medical litera-
ture concerning endotoxins); cf. Mason v. Texaco, Inc., 741 F. Supp. 1472 (D. Kan. 1990)
(plaintiff's expert epidemiologists could testify regarding causation despite defendant's
argument that epidemiology does not provide a basis for an opinion about whether the
occurrence of disease in a given individual was caused by exposure to a sub3tance).
" In Christophersen v. Allied-Signal Corp., 939 F.2d 1106 (6th Cir. 1991) (en banc),
the court in a per curiam opinion adopted a test for admissibility of expert opinion evi-
dence that appears to upgrade judicial scrutiny of such testimony significantly by adopt-
ing a variant of the famous Frye rule. See Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir.
1923). The suit in Christophersen sought wrongful death damages for a worker at de-
1991]
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The significance of this background for the litigation/science
fendant's plant on the basis that his regular exposure to fumes containing nickel and
cadmium had caused the colon cancer that killed him. Plaintiff proposed to rely at trial
on an expert who testified in his deposition that plaintiff's small-cell carcinoma of the
colon was associated with exposure to these heavy metals. The expert relied on studies
linking exposure to heavy metals to development of small-cell carcinoma in the lungs
and asserted that this was a proper analogy. Defendant's experts testified that this anal-
ogy "has no support in medical science and is without foundation," id. at 1116, and the
district court found that the theory advanced by plaintiff's expert was "without prece-
dent in cancer epidemiology and is not scientifically correct." Id. at 1116. The district
court therefore ruled that the testimony of plaintiff's expert was inadmissible and
granted summary judgment to defendant.
A panel of the Fifth Circuit unanimously reversed, ruling that the testimony of
plaintiff's expert should be admitted at trial, and therefore that summary judgment for
defendant was improper. Christophersen v. Allied-Signal Corp., 902 F.2d 362 (6th Cir.
1990). The court then granted rehearing en banc and, in a per curiam opinion, affirmed
the district court's decision in favor of defendant. 939 F.2d 1106.
Much as one might sympathize with the conclusion that breathing fumes containing
toxins is more likely to cause lung cancer than colon cancer, the majority of the en banc
court held that it was not proper for the district judge to reject the analogy drawn by
plaintiff's expert between colon and lung cancer as scientifically wrong, stating that
"[t]his finding of what is a scientifically correct conclusion is not for the district court."
Id. at 1116. It felt, however, that "[a]ll Dr. Miller had was a scientific hunch, which as far
as the record shows, no one else shares. This was enough to support further investigation
but was inadequate to support a judgment in favor of Christophersen." Id. at 1115.
The court explained that this conclusion followed from a three-part test for admissi-
bility of expert testimony. First, a court should ask whether the expert's qualifications
are sufficient under Federal Rule of Evidence 702, which it took to be satisfied. Id. at
1112-13. Second, the court is to ask whether the facts upon which the opinion are based
are of the type that other experts in the field would rely upon within the meaning of
Federal Rule of Evidence 703. On this score, the appellate court found the information
about dosage and exposure that the expert relied upon "inaccurate and incomplete." Id.
at 1113-14.
More significant, however, was the court's third step: To these provisions of the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence, the majority of the appellate court added a third criterion based
on Frye, requiring analysis of "the validity of an expert's methodology. . . to determine
whether it connects the facts to the conclusion in a scientifically valid way." Id. at 1115.
It hastened to explain that "[als long as the expert's methodology is well founded, the
nature of the expert's conclusion is generally irrelevant, even if it is controversial or
unique." Id. at 1111. But because plaintiff's expert only had "a scientific hunch," the
district court was within its discretion in concluding "implicitly" that his testimony
failed to meet the Frye test. Id. at 1115-16.
This decision sparked several vigorous signed disagreements among the minority of
the court. Chief Judge Clark concurred in the judgment on the basis of Federal Rule of
Evidence 403 but dissented from the majority's reasoning on admissibility of expert tes-
timony, noting that "[r]ule 703 does not address 'methodology'-how the expert uses the
facts or data to form an opinion. Rule 703 does not authorize a court to approve or
disapprove the expert's conclusion." Id. at 1118.
Judge Reavley (author of the panel opinion), joined by three other dissenters,
charged that the majority was "effectively converting judicial chambers into science star
chambers," id. at 1129, finding that the majority simply decided to accept the defense's
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discovery dispute is twofold. First, discovery is likely to be an
important method for developing information that will in some
cases bear on the admissibility of scientific theories in court.
Second, where scientific theories are admissible in court discov-
ery is a likely source of evidence to rebut or support these theo-
ries. In either context, discovery will serve its traditional role as
a tool that adverse parties use to obtain material to support
their cases in the courtroom. But as in so many other contexts,
such use of discovery can also have disruptive consequences.
Along the litigation/science interface, where large stakes may
turn on long-term research, the potential for disruptive conse-
quences is serious.
II. LITIGATION/ScIENcE DIscovERY WARs
Whatever one's view of the supposed distortion of science in
litigation, litigation seems to be more of an embarrassment than
a threat to science in Scenario A. Principled scientists may grind
their teeth when they learn about the sorts of claptrap others
manage to peddle in court, but they can remain aloof and pursue
science as it has classically been pursued. C.P. Snow's vision can
endure the embarrassment of the litigation sideshow. So long as
the adversary presentation of dueling experts prevails in the liti-
gation arena, however, there will be a reason to use discovery in
some cases to obtain data from scientists not otherwise affiliated
view of the case:
The only evidence in the record to substantiate the majority's Frye holding is
the contrary conclusion of the defense experts, who do not even address critical
aspects of Dr. Miller's disputed "methodology." And even had they refuted his
reasoning with withering particularity, upon what basis can this majority infer
the lack of "general acceptance," especially when the district court did not
even address that issue? Are the affidavits of experts hired by the defense con-
clusive proof of "general acceptance"?
Id. at 1134.
Judge King, concurring in Judge Reavley'e dissent, added a dissent of his own con-
cluding that "at root this is not a case about the Federal Rules of Evidence, albeit that
two of them may have been mangled in the process. It is instead about the outcomes in
toxic tort cases." Id. at 1136. He accused the majority of "an intellectual elitism that
prefers to entrust scientific evaluation to a judge, trained in law, rather than the good
sense of the community. . . ... Id. at 1137.
It is unclear whether the en banc decision represents a new wave of restriction on
expert testimony. If it does, scientists will probably be somewhat comforted that judges
are interposing their views in a more substantive way between the scientific community
and juries.
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with the litigants. Such discovery efforts may impact much more
directly on science as science.42
At the outset, it is important to recognize that this is not
the only way in which litigation may warp scientific activities.
Recently, for example, scientists examining the effects of the Ex-
xon Valdez spill in Prince William Sound have complained that
litigation has shifted scientific efforts away from those that pure
science would endorse.43 Similarly, courts presiding over toxic
tort cases worry that the limitations protective orders place on
dissemination of information scientists receive through discovery
may conflict with the ordinary presumption of openness in sci-
entific research.44 Where science and the litigation process inter-
act, therefore, science confronts new and troubling tensions.
Tensions between litigation and science can become particu-
larly acute when discovery is directed at a nonparty scientist. It
is hard to know how often such discovery efforts occur. In the
late 1960s and early 1970s the main concern about discovery of
scholarly research involved the social sciences, with a particular
emphasis on the criminal justici system's incursion into research
on subcultures in which criminal activity might be involved.4 A
1976 study reported fifty instances of subpoenas directed at uni-
versity researchers over the prior ten years.48 More recently it
has been asserted that researchers' records are subpoenaed
42 Science as science is getting bashed from a number of directions. Thus, Time
Magazine recently published a cover story on the many pressures on scientific research.
See Jaroff, Crisis in the Labs, Tiz , Aug. 26, 1991, at 45. The article quotes one scientist
who is now enrolled in law school: "Well, I didn't get a single job offer from 20 universi-
ties-and I got into every law school I applied to. So I decided to go where I was wanted
... " See id. at 49.
'3 See Cushman, Legal Ripples of Spill Are Said to Distort Big Picture of Damage,
N.Y. Times, May 1, 1990, at C4, col. 1; see also notes 124-26 and accompanying text
infra for a discussion of research on Bendectin.
' E.g., Anderson v. Cryovac, Inc., 805 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1986) (court modified protec-
tive order allowing experts who had access to material through discovery to mention It in
scholarly publications); In re Upjohn Co. Antibiotic Cleocin Prods. Liab. Litig., 81
F.R.D. 482, 483-84 (E.D. Mich. 1979), afl'd, 664 F.2d 114 (6th Cir. 1981) ("it might well
result in a violation of medical ethics if a court were to require an expert acquainted with
the hazards or potential hazards of a drug to conceal that knowledge from the public in
general or particular patients").
"' Nejelski & Lerman, A Researcher-Subject Testimonial Privilege: What to do
Before the Subpoena Arrives, 1971 Wis. L. REV. 1085.
"' See O'Neil, Scientific Research and the First Amendment: An Academic Privi-
lege, 16 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 837, 842 (1983).
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"fairly often" in connection with civil litigation. 7 There are cer-
tainly several reported examples of such efforts.
Application of American Tobacco Co.4 8 presents one such
instance. Oddly, it seems to be an offshoot of successful defense
tactics used in asbestos litigation, a litigation colossus whose ra-
diations are felt throughout the court system.4 9 As asbestos de-
fendants confronted increasingly grim prospects in court, one
bright spot for them was to blame the cigarette smoking of as-
bestos workers as the cause of the plaintiffs' lung problems. Ac-
cording to one leading plaintiffs' attorney, this was "far and
away the most difficult defense to overcome."8' 0
Plaintiffs' lawyers are also resourceful; one way they turned
this problem into a potential advantage was to sue the tobacco
companies, charging them with failing to warn about the special
dangers of smoking for persons exposed to asbestos."1 Not only
might this strategy blunt the tobacco defense raised by the as-
bestos companies, it could also solve a very practical problem
4 Holder, Researchers and Subpoenas: The Troubling Precedent of the Selihoff
Case, 11 INST. REv. BD. 8 (1989).
48 880 F.2d 1520 (2d Cir. 1989).
" See, e.g., Report of the Judicial Conference Ad Hoc Committee on Asbestos Liti-
gation (March 1991). This report, written by a committee of federal judges appointed by
Chief Justice Rehnquist, describes the "impending disaster" facing the court system due
to growing asbestos caseloads as follows:
[T]he worst is yet to come. The committee believes it to be inevitable that,
unless Congress acts to formulate a national solution, with the present rate of
dissipation of the funds of defendant producers due to transaction costs, large
verdicts, and multiple punitive damage awards, all resources for payment of
these claims will be exhausted in a few years.
Id. at 27.
O See P. BRODEUR, OUMAGEOUS iscoNDucv 234 (1985) (quoting attorney Ronald
Motley). This is not to say that the defense always works for the asbestos companies.
Consider the court's treatment of the smoking defense in Cimino v. Raymark Indus., 751
F. Supp. 649 (E.D. Tex. 1990): "For smoking to be considered contributory negligence, it
must be shown that the plaintiff had subjective knowledge of the synergistic relationship
between the asbestos-related disease and smoking and appreciated the danger of contin-
ued smoking." Id. at 658.
51 This tactic may be scotched if the Supreme Court holds that tobacco companies
that complied with federal labelling requirements are immune to civil liability. See Ci-
pollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 893 F.2d 541 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. granted, 111 S. Ct. 1386
(1991). Whatever the fate of the preemption defense, it should be noted that one recent
suit suggests that there may be liability for supplying cigarettes that come with their
own asbestos. A former Kent smoker has sued the manufacturer for selling cigarettes
with filters the company advertised as safer but which actually contained asbestos. See
Margolick, Ex-Kent Smoker Blames Filter of Past for Illness, N.Y. Times, Aug. 30,
1991, at B7, col. 3. It is unclear what the courts should do with such a double whammy.
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confronted by plaintiffs' lawyers, who have good reason to worry
about the asbestos companies' ability to continue paying judg-
ments.2 Surely attorneys with a large supply of plaintiffs would
look hungrily at an industry that has thrived on "the most prof-
itable consumer product ever sold-the cigarette. '53
Both the asbestos companies' defense and the plaintiffs'
claims against the tobacco companies seem to turn on epidemio-
logical research which indicates that smoking and asbestos expo-
sure have a multiplicative rather than only an additive effect on
the likelihood of contracting lung cancer. Given the stakes in-
volved, and the centrality of this research, discovery wars
seemed inevitable.
In Application of American Tobacco Co. several tobacco
companies served subpoenas on Mount Sinai School of Medicine
in New York seeking data used to prepare three articles written
by Dr. Irving Selikoff, a professor at Mt. Sinai. 4 In these arti-
cles, published between 1968 and 1979, Dr. Selikoff and his col-
laborators reported on the frequency and cause of death among
those exposed to neither asbestos nor tobacco, those exposed to
one but not the other, and those exposed to both.," The data
were drawn from studies of thousands of individual cases. The
published conclusion was that those exposed to both asbestos
and cigarette smoke faced a far greater danger of contracting
lung cancer than those exposed to only one of the substances.
The tobacco companies sought access to the underlying data.
All parties agreed that Dr. Selikoff's work was important to
the issues presented by the asbestos plaintiffs' claims against the
tobacco companies. The tobacco companies asserted that the
plaintiffs in their cases would call experts who would rely on Se-
likoff's studies. Resisting enforcement of the subpoenas, Mt. Si-
nai's attorney described one of Selikoff's articles as "one of the
50 most significant articles in the history of medicine." 6 Selikoff
61 See note 49 supra.
83 Gray, Tobacco Firms Defend Smoker Liability Suits With Heavy Artillery, Wall
St. J., Apr. 29, 1987, at 1, col. 6 (quoting Bear, Stearns & Co. litigation analyst).
880 F.2d at 1525.
5 Selikoff, Hammond & Churg, Asbestos Exposure, Smoking, and Neoplasia, 204 J.
A.MA 104 (1968); Hammond, Selikoff & Seidman, Asbestos Exposure, Cigarette Smok-
ing and Death Rates, 330 ANNALs N.Y. AcAD. SCL 473 (1979); Selikoff, Seidman & Ham-
mond, Mortality Effects of Cigarette Smoking Among Amosite Asbestos Factory Work-
ers, 65 J. NAT'L CANCER INST. 507 (1980).
86 Appendix, Application of American Tobacco Co., 880 F.2d 1520 (2d Cir. 1989)
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himself characterized his studies as "authoritative."0 17 That, of
course, was a proposition that the tobacco companies were hop-
ing to challenge on the basis of the research data.
Citing "literally hundreds" of subpoenas for this material,
Mt. Sinai moved to quash the subpoenas. It claimed that the
tobacco companies were "interested in harassing Mt. Sinai and
Dr. Selikoff"55 and assembled a formidable cast of supporters for
its motion to quash, including a former Surgeon General of the
United States, 59 the President of the American Association of
University Professors"° and the Dean of Yale Medical School."'
Mt. Sinai argued that the courts should recognize a qualified re-
searchers' privilege because the proposed discovery would deter
researchers from investigating controversial matters and would
improperly compromise the confidentiality of research subjects.
It added that complying with the subpoenas would be unduly
burdensome because they sought an enormous amount of de-
tailed data on thousands of research subjects. The tobacco com-
panies energetically joined issue.
Mt. Sinai succeeded in quashing subpoenas issued by New
York state courts on the ground that they were overburden-
some.62 It failed, however, to persuade Judge Duffy of the South-
ern District of New York to quash a narrower subpoena issued
by the federal court, and he ordered production of a computer
(No. 88-7879) [hereinafter "Appendix"], at A59-60 (oral argument on Motion to Quash
Subpoena in New York state court (In re RJ. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 136 Misc. 2d 282,
518 N.Y.S.2d 729 (Sup. Ct 1987))). The Appendix in this case was actually the record on
appeal from a separate proceeding, In re American Tobacco Co., 866 F.2d 552 (2d Cir.
1989), in which the court held that Mt. Sinai could not appeal the document production
subpoena order before it had been held in contempt. Mt. Sinai was later held in con-
tempt by Judge Duffy. 880 F.2d at 1522.
87 Appendix, supra note 56, at A182 (Affidavit of Irving Selikoff).
" Appendix, supra note 56, at A300, A305 (Affidavit of Nathan Kase, Dean of Mt.
Sinai Hospital).
"I Appendix, supra note 56, at A473-76 (Affidavit of Julius B. Richmond, Director of
Harvard University's Division of Health Policy Research and Education, and Surgeon
General of the United States from 1977 to 1981).
60 Appendix, supra, note 56, at A353-59 (Affidavit of Paul H. Walter).
61 Appendix, supra note 56, at A348-52 (Affidavit of Leon E. Rosenberg).
See In Re R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 136 Misc. 2d 282, 518 N.Y.S.2d 729 (Sup.
Ct. 1987). In federal court, Mt. Sinai argued that this decision should estop the tobacco
companies from relitigating their right to subpoena the research data related to Dr. Se-
likoff's studies. Problems with relitigation of issues of this sort are endemic in much
complex litigation, see generally H. MARcus & E. SuHEn, ComnLEx LrnGATIoN. 148-232
(1985), but are beyond the scope of this article.
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tape containing research data with the names of the subjects re-
dacted.6 3 Mt. Sinai appealed.
The Second Circuit affirmed, but without definitively deter-
mining whether there should be a research scholar's privilege as
a matter of New York law. Instead, the Second Circuit noted
that Judge Duffy's analysis showed that he would have refused
to quash the subpoena even if such a privilege existed, and
summed up its attitude by invoking the classic purposes of
discovery:
Since Dr. Selikoff is acknowledged to be the preeminent authority in
the area and it is anticipatable that the expert witnesses to be called
by the plaintiffs in the underlying suits will rely on his findings, the
district court was not required to relegate the tobacco companies to
undertaking independent studies rather than pursuing the most direct
method of attack on the Selikoff findings.
We are unpersuaded that a contrary result is required by the fact
that the medical researchers have no direct interest in the underlying
lawsuits. The publication of their findings and conclusions invites use
by persons whom the findings favor and invites reliance by the finders
of fact. The public has an interest in resolving disputes on the basis of
accurate information."
Thereafter, Mt. Sinai did produce certain materials to the to-
bacco companies, but these materials have not been used in the
cases for which the subpoenas were issued because those cases
have not gone to trial.6
Aligning this case in the spectrum from Scenario A to Sce-
nario B suggests that it is much closer to the latter. Certainly
Dr. Selikoff is no Dr. Crackpot, and Mt. Sinai is, as trumpeted
by its Dean, "one of the preeminent medical research institu-
tions in the country. ' 6 From the perspective of the defendants,
however, Dr. Selikoff may appear to be something of a zealot. A
reporter has written that "only the uncompromising commit-
ment of Dr. Selikoff, who has worked tirelessly for more than
twenty years to make his findings known, and the dedication of.
. . plaintiff lawyers who, following his lead, carried on... have
brought to light the truth about the suffering wrought by the
"3 American Tobacco, 880 F.2d at 1525.
4 Id. at 1529.
65 Telephone conference with Garyowen Morrisroe, of the law firm of Chadbourne &
Parke (New York), attorney for American Tobacco Co. (Apr. 5, 1991).
" See Appendix, supra note 56, at A298 (Affidavit of Nathan Kase).
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asbestos industry." 7 In papers filed in opposition to the subpoe-
nas, Dr. Selikoff, though in his seventies, reported that he typi-
cally works ten hours a day, six days a week. 8 If he is a
crusader, Dr. Selikoff may resemble Dr. Humanitarian in Scena-
rio B.
Even where a researcher's privilege is found to exist, courts
will not necessarily protect Dr. Humanitarian, as illustrated by
the other leading case in the area. In Deitchman v. E.R. Squibb
& Sons, Inc.69 the plaintiff sought damages for in utero exposure
to diethylstilbestrol (DES). The defendant manufacturer sub-
poenaed all documents in the Registry for Hormonal Transpla-
cental Carcinogenesis at the University of Chicago. The Registry
had been maintained for more than ten years by Dr. Herbst, a
University of Chicago medical professor. It contained over five
hundred case files and was the only centralized repository of
data on the disease. Dr. Herbst had published more than a
dozen articles regarding this material and was engaged in ongo-
ing research activities on the subject. Having promised to keep
all information he obtained confidential, he moved to quash the
subpoena, arguing that his sources would dry up if confidential-
ity were breached. The district court granted the motion, noting
that to enforce the subpoena would harm the Registry and that,
as a result, "all society will be the poorer... [and] a unique and
vital resource for learning about the incidence, causes and treat-
ment of adenocarcinoma will be lost."70
The Seventh Circuit vacated. It found that concerns about
confidentiality could be solved by some sort of redaction and
viewed the principal dispute to be whether discovery should be
denied on grounds of privilege.7" Assuming arguendo that such a
qualified privilege applied, the court found that the defendant
had shown an "absolute necessity" to justify discovery.7 2 It
87 P. BRODEUR, supra note 50, at 180. Mr. Brodeur likens this effort to Emile Zola's
publication of J'AccusE, which focused much attention on the injustice done to Captain
Dreyfus in France in the late 19th century.
Appendix, supra note 56, at A189 (Affidavit of Irving Selikoff). Dr. Selikofrs
point was that he already had too much to do without spending time reviewing research
data to prepare it for production to the tobacco companies.
69 740 F.2d 556 (7th Cir. 1984).
70 Andrews v. Eli Lilly & Co., 97 F.RLD. 494, 500 (N.D. IlL 1983), vacated sub non.
Deitchman v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 740 F.2d 556 (7th Cir. 1984).
71 740 F.2d at 560.
71 Id. at 561. The court cited Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 709-10 (1972) (Pow-
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found that the plaintiffs' experts were likely to rely exclusively
on Dr. Herbst's publications7 3 and therefore that the defendant's
opportunity to challenge plaintiffs' experts was unfairly
compromised:
What Squibb is threatened with is having Dr. Herbst as a potent ex-
pert witness against it without his ever taking the stand or being sub-
ject to cross-examination. The situation is unique because there is
placed in the hands of a nonwitness the capability of influencing the
verdict far beyond that enjoyed normally by the most qualified expert
witness who does take the stand. It appears likely that any expert who
challenges Dr. Herbst's views can be refuted by the argument that
this witness does not know the most pertinent evidence, the contents
of the Registry files, and Dr. Herbst does know that.74
Thus, discovery can be justified as a tool to further the adver-
sary process, even in Scenario B.
This invocation of the adversary process nicely frames the
two basic questions to be addressed in coping with discovery
problems: (1) whether to treat research data as privileged, and
(2) how to evaluate the factors that bear on ordering such data
to be turned over. We turn to these now.
III. To PRIVILEGE OR NOT To PRIVILEGE?
From the perspective of scientists, the preferred solution to
discovery wars involving scientific data would be to create a re-
searcher's privilege. Those seeking access to research data,
equally predictably, would invoke the general proposition that
discovery is allowed as to any relevant matter that is not privi-
leged 7 5 and point out that there is no generally recognized privi-
lege for scientific research. A basic question therefore seems to
be whether such a privilege should be recognized.
Without unduly downplaying this basic question, particu-
larly given the amendment to Rule 4576 it appears that the reso-
lution of the privilege question will not substantially affect the
outcome of litigation/science discovery wars. Outside the tradi-
tional privileges, there has been a debate about whether recur-
ell, J., concurring), for the proposition that qualified privileges "must yield if to enforce
them would produce a miscarriage of justice." Id.
740 F.2d at 562.
Id. at 561.
"FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
"See note 9 and accompanying text supra.
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rent immunities to discovery should be so labeled. When the Su-
preme Court first embraced work product, for example, it was
careful to state that it was not creating a new privilege, yet there
ensued a debate over whether this protection from discovery
should be called a privilege.7 A similar debate might ensue
about the proper characterization of the protections Rule 45 now
authorizes for nonparty expert witnesses.
This debate has limited relevance for the issues before us,
however. If a privilege is indeed allowed, all seem to concede
that it would not be absolute. The prospect of abrogation based
on a showing of need hardly offers the sanctity of classic privi-
lege-at least that of the attorney-client privilege. But the ad
hoc flavor of newer privileges is consistent with the Supreme
Court's recent analysis of requests for new privileges, which is to
adopt a frank balancing approach. Intoning the public's "right
to every man's evidence," the Court is likely to ask whether a
proposed privilege "promotes sufficiently important interests to
outweigh the need for probative evidence."78 Privilege protection
has therefore become more of a slippery slope than some may
recall from their law school days.
At the same time, in the discovery area the public's right to
every man's evidence has come in for some hard knocks as a
result of perceived abuse and overuse of discovery. The 1980 and
1983 amendments to Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure move away from untrammelled access to all arguably rel-
evant material and toward a regime of greater restraint by the
court.79 Although privileges may not be as solid as they once
were, therefore, neither is broad discovery quite as broad as it
once was. One tool courts use to curtail undesirable conse-
quences of broad discovery is to order that discovery not take
- See Marcus, The Perils of Privilege: Waiver and the Litigator, 84 MICL L. REV.
1605, 1623-24 (1986).
7 Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 50-51 (1980) (citations omitted); see J.
WEmsTiN & M. BERGER, supra note 8, 1 501[03], at 501-40 ("'reason and experience'
dictate balancing the public's need for the full development of relevant facts in federal
litigation against the countervailing demand for confidentiality").
79 It has recently been proposed that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 be
amended again to require initial disclosures of evidence informally before formal discov-
ery gets underway. See Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments, supra note 33, at
87-91. These proposals have not been approved by the Standing Committee on the Rules
of Practice and Procedure, and could not take effect before December 1, 1993, at the
earliest.
1991]
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
place. This discovery management approach, which is reinforced
by the recent amendment to Rule 45, affords a competing model
of protection. It is keyed to the specifics of a given case that may
turn on similar concerns and provides protection a great deal
like a qualified privilege.
For scientists, the choice between these models is easy. Dis-
regarding the uncertainty of qualified privileges, they are likely
to deplore the ad hoc treatment they have received from courts
because "[t]he unfortunate result is that courts are asked to re-
solve data-sharing issues on a case-by-case basis, thereby offer-
ing little guidance for future controversies." 80 Some legal com-
mentary also favors recognition of a privilege,"' but others favor
a protective order approach.2
Against this background, it is not surprising that the re-
searcher's privilege has a spotty record in reported cases ema-
nating from litigation/science discovery wars. In American To-
bacco the Second Circuit expressed uncertainty about whether
there is any such privilege under New York law. 3 In 1984 the
court reversed a decision by Judge Weinstein that recognized
such a privilege because the witness raising the issue had not
made a sufficient showing that a privilege should apply to him.8 4
Although the American Tobacco court did assert that the Sev-
enth Circuit "has recognized such a qualified privilege," 5 the
Seventh Circuit's decisions are less definite. In Deitchman the
Seventh Circuit said only that "[w]e agree arguendo that the
Registry files may enjoy a qualified privilege," but promptly
held that they had to be produced anyway.88 That decision
rested in turn on a 1982 case which discussed the importance of
maintaining academic freedom in upholding a district court's re-
So Yolles, Connors & Grufferman, Obtaining Access to Data from Government-
Sponsored Medical Research, 315 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1669, 1669 (1986).
E.g., O'Neil, supra note 46; Nejeski & Lerman, supra note 45.
8 E.g., Note, Forced Disclosure of Academic Research, 37 VAND. L. REV. 585, 615-17
(1984); Note, Free Press, Privacy, and Privilege: Protection of Researcher-Subject Com-
munications, 17 GA. L. REv. 1009, 1043 (1983).
See 880 F.2d at 1528.
In re Grand Jury Subpoena dtd. January 4, 1984, 750 F.2d 223 (2d Cir. 1984),
reversing 583 F. Supp. 991 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
8' 880 F.2d at 1528.
,' 740 F.2d 556, 560-61 (7th Cir. 1984) (construed in American Tobacco, 880 F.2d at
1528); cf. Deitchman, 740 F.2d at 565 ("Anything not necessary must be viewed as cov-
ered by the privilege.").
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fusal to enforce a subpoena.87 Although the 1982 decision seems
to fall far short of creating a privilege, the reliance on academic
freedom did provoke disagreement from one member of the
panel.88 Others claim that a 1976 district court decision refusing
to order revelation of research results by a social scientist", rec-
ognizes a privilege,90 but the court there averred that "[t]he re-
sult reached here is not based upon any privilege." ' Other
courts, meanwhile, have explicitly refused to recognize such a
privilege.92
There are reasons to be circumspect about handling the liti-
gation/science discovery wars under the privilege rubric. Federal
Rule of Evidence 501 directs federal courts to apply state law
privileges when evidence is sought with respect to claims or de-
fenses to be decided under state law. This requirement reflects
Congress's insistence that privilege issues remain matters of
state law.' 3 Much of the litigation provoking discovery of re-
search data, particularly personal injury litigation, is likely to be
based on state law. But there is little state law to apply,0 and
federal courts asked to find it may also confront sticky choice of
law questions.9 In American Tobacco, for example, the Second
Circuit seemed somewhat uncertain about whether New York
might adopt such a privilege even though there had been a pre-
Dow Chemical Co. v. Allen, 672 F.2d 1262 (7th Cir. 1982).
Id. at 1278-80 (Pell, J., concurring).
" Richards of Rockford, Inc. v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 71 F.R.D. 388 (NJ). Cal.
1976).
See Kaplan & Cogan, The Case Against Recognition of a General Academic Priu-
ilege, 60 U. Dgr. J. URAN L. 205, 209 (1983); cf. J. WwNsTRIN & M. B GER, supra note
8, 501[03], at 501-39 n.21.
"1 71 F.R.D. at 389 n.2.
2E.g., Solarex Corp. v. Arco Solar, Inc., 121 F.R.D. 163, 164, 169-70 (E.D.N.Y.
1988), aff'd, 870 F.2d 642 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
9 "See generally 23 C. WRIGHT & K. GR= FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §
5421 (1980) [hereinafter FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE].
'4 "No state has yet recognized a privilege for research sources." Id. § 6430, at 822.
This is not to say that state law may never provide a pertinent privilege. See Board of
Trustees of Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. v. Superior Court, 119 Cal. App. 3d 516, 174 Cal.
Rptr. 160 (Ct. App. 1981) (refusing to order research materials turned over because they
have no "direct relevance" and revelation would infringe privacy rights guaranteed by
the state constitution).
,1 In a case such as American Tobacco, where litigation has occurred acro:s the na-
tion, and the researcher has gathered material nationwide, interesting arguments might
be made about how to identify the state whose law should be applied to determine
whether a privilege should be found. For a discussion of these choice of law problems, see
FEDEAnL PRACnCE AND PROCEDURE, supra note 93, § 5435.
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vious confrontation regarding similar subpoenas between the to-
bacco companies and Mt. Sinai in state court. In the face of this
thin record, federal judges may be tempted to rely on "general"
principles of law and disregard state law. Thus, in Deitchman
the Seventh Circuit cited no state law in its discussion of privi-
lege. In other cases, -the federal courts have acknowledged that
there is no privilege under state law but have entered protective
orders anyway."8 On balance, the need to rely on state law is
likely to retard the development of a privilege approach.
Beyond that, the path to creation of a new privilege would
not be easy even if the question were controlled by federal law.
Federal Rule of Evidence 501 allows the federal courts to create
new privileges on the basis of "reason and experience." Although
the lower courts have developed some new privileges, 97 the Su-
preme Court has taken a restrictive attitude and has recently
rejected privilege arguments quite similar to those advanced for
a researcher's privilege. In University of Pennsylvania v.
EEOC,s a 1990 decision, the Court refused to find a qualified
academic freedom privilege for peer review materials in tenure
files. Responding to a complaint of discrimination in denial of
tenure, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission sub-
poenaed tenure files on the complainant and five other people.
The university argued that courts should "require more than rel-
evance in order to protect tenure review documents" 99 to protect
academic freedom. The Court disagreed.
In large measure the University of Pennsylvania decision
rested on the legislative history of Title VII, which Congress had
amended to cover educational institutions despite arguments for
immunity based on similar academic freedom notions. 100 But the
university also advanced a First Amendment claim akin to argu-
ments made by commentators for a researcher's privilege. 101 The
university began by invoking precedents that emphasized the
"E.g., Richards of Rockford, Inc. v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 71 F.R.D. 388 (N.D.
Cal. 1976).
" A prominent example is the privilege for self-critical analysis. See Bredice v. Doc-
tors Hospital, Inc., 50 F.R.D. 249 (D.D.C. 1970), afl'd, 479 F.2d 920 (D.C. Cir. 1973);
Note, The Privilege of Self-Critical Analysis, 96 HARv. L. REv. 1083 (1983). The viability
of this privilege is stil open to debate.
9 493 U.S. 182 (1990).
"Id. at 188.
100 See id. at 187-90.
E.g., O'Neil, supra note 46, at 845-53.
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need to insulate the university against state regulation, includ-
ing regulation of selection of faculty.1 0 2 This protection depends
on the tenure system, the university asserted, and that in turn
relies on the peer review process. Hence, the university con-
cluded, granting access to peer review materials would erode the
linchpin of academic freedom because that would have a chilling
effect on candid peer evaluation.
The Court was not moved, finding that the cases the univer-
sity relied upon were different because they involved efforts "to
control or direct the content of the speech engaged in by the
university or those affiliated with it.'1o°3 On this occasion, how-
ever, the university asserted only that discovery would have an
adverse effect on the quality of instruction and scholarship, and
not that the subpoenas "[were] intended to or [would] in fact
direct the content of university discourse toward or away from
particular subjects or points of view."0 Moreover, except to the
extent such inquiry would restrain the university's ability to dis-
criminate on forbidden grounds, there was no governmental ef-
fort to second-guess legitimate academic judgments. 03 Hence,
the university sought "an expanded right of academic free-
dom." 10 Because similar chill arguments are made in favor of a
researcher's privilege,0 7 the Court's resistance to them in Uni-
versity of Pennsylvania augurs a poor reception for the
researcher.
In a related area, the Court resisted First Amendment argu-
ments for a privilege allowing reporters to withhold the identity
of sources in Branzburg v. Hayes.03 The Court was closely di-
vided, however, and the lower courts have recognized a qualified
reporter's privilege to protect sources.10 9 Indeed, Professor
O'Neil has found that the lower courts' treatment of the prob-
lem "has left Branzburg almost more the exception than the
rule." ' 0 In addition, many states have created such reporters'
102 See 493 U.S. at 190-91 (quoting, inter alia, Sweezy v. New Hamp3hire, 354 U.S.
234, 263 (1957)).
211 493 U.S. at 191 (emphasis in original).
104 Id. at 192.
105 Id.
10 Id. (emphasis in original).
107 See text accompanying notes 114-17 infra.
10 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
1.0 See F!EDAL PRAMCE AND PaocEnua, supra note 93, § 5426, at 745-47.
110 See O'Neil, supra note 46, at 847; see also FmmL. PRAczcE Am PRocEDuRE,
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privileges by statute, or under the state constitution, often af-
fording very broad protection."1 Despite this ambiguous recep-
tion in the lower courts, the Court invoked Branzburg in Uni-
versity of Pennsylvania as"'similar" because Branzburg rejected
a constitutional argument for protection against "incidental bur-
dening" due to enforcement of civil or criminal statutes of gen-
eral applicability. 12
At the constitutional level, then, the Supreme Court prece-
dents do not augur well for a researcher's privilege against civil
discovery, and the arguments for a common law privilege via a
balancing process similarly confront real difficulties. Balanced
against the creation of such a privilege is the customary justifi-
cation for discovery, one that becomes especially forceful when
the researcher's work product will be used in one manner or an-
other at trial.lla Given the Court's commitment to access to evi-
dence, it seems difficult to justify the sort of privilege research-
ers want even in those cases where federal common law may be
applied under Federal Rule of Evidence 501.
The first argument for a privilege stresses the risk that al-
lowing discovery may chill research in areas that are likely to be
pertinent to litigation. As a threshold matter, this seems a curi-
ous reason for a privilege because privileges are usually keyed to
protecting communications. Some courts have rejected research-
ers' arguments on this ground," 4 but this objection may not be
fatal. Other privilege claims, such as the privilege for self-critical
inquiry, look beyond protecting communications and focus on
supra note 93, § 5426, at 745-46 ("The ink was scarcely dry on Justice White's majority
opinion [in Branzburg] when the process of distinguishing it began.").
"I For example, the California Constitution and Evidence Code has been found to
afford very broad protection to the media in civil and even in connection with criminal
cases. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 2, subdiv. (b); CAL. Evm. CODE § 1070 (West Supp. 1991) See,
e.g., New York Times Co. v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. 3d 453, 796 P.2d 811, 273 Cal. Rptr.
98 (1990) (newspaper could refuse to turn over unpublished photographs of accident that
gave rise to products liability action); Delaney v. Superior Court, 50 Cal. 3d 785, 789
P.2d 934, 268 Cal. Rptr. 753 (1990) (reporter did not have to disclose unpublished non-
confidential eyewitness information unless defendant demonstrated reasonable likelihood
that information would be helpful in defense).
112 493 U.S. at 193.
I's See text accompanying notes 54-55 & 74 supra (regarding likely use of research-
ers' work at trial in American Tobacco and Deitchman).
1"I E.g., Solarex Corp. v. Arco Solar, Inc., 121 F.R.D. 163, 168 (E.D.N.Y. 1988), afl'd,
870 F.2d 642 (Fed. Cir. 1989) ("the Society's proposed privilege is apparently not testi-
monial in nature but rather a form of qualified immunity from discovery").
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the possibility that discovery will deter people from investigat-
ing thoroughly.115 Moreover, this prospect raises risks that dis-
covery might become a tool to shape the content of academic
research, which the Supreme Court suggested could implicate
constitutional values.1 6 Thus, some courts have worried about
Scenario B-that subpoenas could be used with the intent to
frustrate research that was viewed as threatening.1 7
The abstract possibility of deterrence does not, of itself,
warrant the creation of a new privilege. Instead, there should be
a concrete showing that such a threat exists. In American To-
bacco Mt. Sinai tried to demonstrate that the tobacco companies
were using discovery to interfere with research, stressing that
over two hundred subpoenas had been made for Dr. Selikoff's
data, and that it had received multiple subpoenas from tobacco
companies for that data.118 Given their resources, and their ef-
forts in other contexts to prevent disclosure of potentially injuri-
ous material,1 9 the tobacco companies seem to have earned our
suspicion in this regard. 20
It is nevertheless hard to conclude that this concern war-
rants creation of a privilege.121 The basic argument is that re-
215 Thus, it has been suggested that this privilege is justified in part to avoid the
chilling effect of discovery.
[Mf a plaintiff obtains discovery, there may be a direct chilling effect on the
institutional or individual self-analyst; this effect operates to discourage the
analyst from investigating thoroughly and frankly or even from investigating at
all.
Note, supra note 97, at 1091-92. The idea, then, is to encourage institutional intro3pec-
tion, not just communication.
116 See text accompanying notes 104-05 supra. Note, however, that the government's
power to influence the content of academic research through funding decisions far ex-
ceeds any impact that discovery could have.
n7 See Dow Chemical Co. v. Allen, 672 F.2d 1262 (7th Cir. 1982):
It is not unduly speculative to imagine that a large private corporation,
through repeatedly securing broad-based subpoenas requiring total disclosure
of all notes, reports, working papers, and raw data relating to on-going studies,
could make research in a particular field so undesirable as to chill or inhibit
whole areas of scientific inquiry.
Id. at 1276 n.25.
"8 See text accompanying note 58 supra.
29 See, e.g., Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 785 F.2d 1108 (3d Cir. 1986) (tobacco
companies made effort to use protective orders to prevent plaintiff from disclosing mate-
rial they turned over through discovery to other plainti).
120 See note 146 infra (regarding tobacco company efforts to discredit research on
the dangers of smoking).
121 See Developments in the Law-Privileged Communications, 98 HARv. L. Rzy.
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searchers will avoid controversial areas because they want to
avoid controversy. But controversy is often a magnet for atten-
tion to academic work. Although there are undoubtedly some re-
searchers who eschew the limelight, there are certainly others
who flock to it. So controversy alone is not sufficient to justify a
privilege. Moreover, controversy may attract the lifeblood of
much academic research-funding-and thereby alter the aca-
demic research agenda. 122 With regard to governmental funding,
such decisions may become more overtly the subject of lobbying
or political pressure. The success of AIDS advocates in promot-
ing funding for AIDS research seems to have generated a new
kind of advocacy; some women's groups now intend to emulate
AIDS advocates to pry loose more funding for research regarding
breast cancer. 123 Controversy alone therefore seems insufficient
to justify a new privilege; for every scientist who is deterred by
controversy, it is reasonable to expect that another will be at-
tracted, particularly if funding comes in the wake of controversy.
Controversy involving litigation might be another matter,
however. The current litigation phobia that afflicts broad sectors
of our nation, and particularly the professional classes, could
provide a reason for treating such situations differently. Cer-
tainly the capacity of litigants to activate the long arm of the
law through discovery could make controversial areas involving
litigation different and more daunting than others. The jaded
might say that no area is litigation-proof, but that does not dis-
pel the possibility that many scientists would see certain re-
search topics as presenting a greater risk of involvement in
litigation.
But we do not have evidence to support the conclusion that
litigation is an especially daunting type of controversy for re-
searchers. To the contrary, there is reason to doubt this. Again
Bendectin provides an example. If the theory were correct, one
would expect researchers to shun Bendectin research when the
prospect of litigation reared its head. As Professor Sanders' ex-
1450, 1610 (1985) ("No special considerations dictate the creation of a general privilege
for all academic researchers . . ").
112 E.g., Eisenberg, Academic Freedom and Academic Values in Sponsored Re-
search, 66 TMX L. REv. 1363, 1376-77 (1988) (the risk that researchers will gravitate to
topics for which funding is available is an intractable problem).
I" Gross, Turning Disease Into Political Cause: First AIDS, and Now Breast Can-
cer, N.Y. Times, Jan. 7, 1991, at A12, col. 1.
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haustive study of Bendectin litigation shows, however, precisely
the reverse seems to have happened:
[In connection with the Bendectin litigation,] it is clear that science
was driven by the law. The study of Bendectin became a hot topic and
substantial resources were mobilized to study it. This mobilization can
be understood at several levels. Because Bendectin was a hot topic,
articles on the subject would be relatively likely to find their way into
print. Careerist concerns might cause academics to select topics that
would produce published articles in prestigious journals. Moreover,
the government, through the FDA, encouraged research by holding
out the potential to get grants to study Bendectin's effects. Finally,
the litigation itself generated research, as the parties to the litigation
encouraged work on Bendectin. If, ultimately, the fate of the Bendec-
tin cases rested in large part on the epidemiological findings, the
causal effects ran in both directions. Legal needs gave shape and di-
rection to the epidemiological study of teratogenic effects. The volume
and sophistication of studies specifically on Bendectin was in large
part the result of the litigation. 12'
We have already seen that litigation may distort the research
agenda of science;'25 at least one editorial in a scientific journal
raised eyebrows about the expenditure of research time on
Bendectin, even after it had been withdrawn from the market. 12
The Bendectin experience suggests that there is little reason to
fear that litigation will, on balance, deter researchers from enter-
ing an area.
This experience seems to have been repeated in connection
with the research involved in American Tobacco. Despite the
supposed barrage of discovery directed toward him, Dr. Selikoff
has persevered. And other research on the link between ciga-
rettes and lung cancer continues as well.127 Whether or not liti-
gation unduly attracts scientific research, it does not seem to
have a provable chilling effect.
The other basic argument is that a privilege is essential to
persuade potential research subjects to agree to submit to the
1" Sanders, The Bendectin Litigation: A Case Study in the Life-Cycle of Mass
Torts, 43 HASTiNGS LJ. (forthcoming 1992).
See text accompanying note 43 supra.
12 Scialli, supra note 20, at 157 ("The filling of a gap in knowledge is unquestion-
ably an appropriate use of science, but clinicians may be curious about the expenditure
of time and energy on Bendectin, a formulation which is no longer marketed.").
2 See Angier, Cigarettes Trigger Lung Cancer Gene, Researchers Find, N.Y.
Times, Aug. 21, 1990, at C3, col 2.
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study. This comes closer to a traditional focus on communica-
tions in privilege law, and can be analogized to the reporters'
privilege recognized by many lower federal courts.1 28 But for
many reasons it does not justify the sort of privilege researchers
have claimed. First, it is too broad because research does not
always involve human subjects. Laboratory animals may be
used,1 29 and for the present there is no requirement that their
consent be obtained.13 0 Other studies may not involve any live
subjects.
Second, broad assertions about the need for confidentiality
need to be scrutinized. True, there is little empirical basis for
the assumed necessity of such confidentiality under traditional
privileges such as the attorney-client privilege.131 Yet the courts
cannot and do not credit all arguments about the need for confi-
dentiality that can be imagined in the abstract. Even researchers
recognize that promises of confidentiality are made when they
are not necessary.13 2 There is surely ground to doubt that confi-
dentiality is always essential.
Third, and most important, the confidentiality argument
does not go far enough to support a general researcher's privi-
lege. Protection of subjects' identities where there is reason to
fear disclosure need not depend upon creation of a privilege for
researchers, as the treatment of confidentiality below demon-
128 See text accompanying notes 108-11 supra; FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE,
supra note 93, § 5430, at 821 ("The arguments favoring a privilege for scholarly research
sources are often based on the premise that supports the newsmen's privilege ... .
129 E.g., Dow Chemical Co. v. Allen, 672 F.2d 1262 (7th Cir. 1982) (rhesus monkeys).
230 Legal limitations have been imposed on the use of animals in laboratory re-
search. See generally Dresser, Assessing Harm and Justification in Animal Research:
Federal Policy Opens the Laboratory Door, 40 RUTGERS L. REV. 723 (1988). The new
approach relies on humans to evaluate the propriety of research, not on informed con-
sent of the research subjects. See id. at 728-31.
21 E.g., Louisell, Confidentiality, Conformity and Confusion: Privileges in Federal
Court Today, 31 TuIL L. Rav. 101, 112 (1956) (disclosure promotion theory underlying
attorney-client privilege based on "sheer speculation"); Saltzburg, Corporate Attorney-
Client Privilege in Shareholder Litigation and Similar Cases: Garner Revisited, 12 Hoy-
STRA L. REv. 817, 822 (1984) (privilege based on "an educated guess about behavior");
Note, Functional Overlap Between the- Lawyer and Other Professionals: Its Implica-
tions for the Privileged Communications Doctrine, 71 YALE L.J. 1226, 1236 (1962) ("The
mythical average American is, as likely as not, either misinformed or uninformed about
the attorney-client privilege.").
12 Holder, supra note 47, at 9 ("Promises of confidentiality are routinely included
in consent forms, even about information that reasonable people would probably not
consider necessary to hide.").
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strates.133 Indeed, as suggested by the idea that data sharing is
an ethical obligation of researchers,3 there are ways to protect
confidentiality while allowing sufficient access to the data to per-
mit evaluation of the research conclusions. Hence, the customary
response to this problem is to craft some sort of protective order.
In sum, the requisites for creation of a new privilege do not
appear to be satisfied, and the discovery management route is
therefore likely to continue to prevail under amended Rule 45.
This approach avoids disputes about who is eligible for privilege
protection 135 and focuses instead on the competing interests.
IV. TOWARD A BALANCED RESOLUTION OF LrrIGATION/SCIENCE
DISCOvERY TENSIONS
[I]n this context, we cannot apply a per se rule; instead we must bal-
ance the competing interests.
Judge Jack Weinstein"-
Whatever the rubric under which it is done, the task of rec-
onciling litigation and science when discovery is contested re-
quires evaluation of the contending concerns. This Part exam-
ines these concerns and provides perspectives for future
evaluation that should be used under amended Rule 45.137 The
general starting points are derived from the current climate for
discovery: Access should be allowed to permit full preparation
for trial and, at the same time, scientific research should not be
133 See text accompanying notes 184-90 infra.
See text accompanying notes 138-47 infra.Second Circuit case law already contains an example of such a conundrum that
sounds like a law professor's invention. Police investigating possible arson in connection
with a restaurant fire questioned the restaurant's waiters. One of them, a Ph.D. candi-
date at the State University of New York at Stony Brook, claimed a researcher's privi-
lege for a journal he kept of his observations at work. He explained that his job waiting
tables was actually field work for his dissertation on "The Sociology of the American
Restaurant." Analogizing this situation to the news reporter's privilege, Judge Weinstein
partially upheld the waiter's claim. In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 583 F. Supp. 991
(E.D.N.Y. 1984). The Second Circuit reversed, however, without ruling whether there
ever should be such a privilege, because the waiter had not made a sufficient showing of
the nature and methodology of his scholarship or of the need for assurances of confiden-
tiality to conduct the study. In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 750 F.2d 223 (2d Cir. 1984).
Although these definitional problems can also arise with the reporters' privilege that the
lower courts have devised, the discovery management approach seems suited to avoid
preoccupation with them.
138 Apicelia v. McNeil Laboratories, Inc., 66 F.R.D. 78, 82 (E.D.N.Y. 1975).
137 See note 9 and accompanying text supra.
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unduly impeded by the discovery. Both Scenario A and Scenario
B must be kept in mind.
A., Data Sharing in Science
A suitable starting point is to consider access to research
data within the scientific community. This was the form of
openness that C.P. Snow had in mind when he wrote that sci-
ence was done in the open. If access is granted to further the
purposes of science, that provides a notable analogy when access
is sought to further the purposes of litigation. As we shall see,
the themes that emerge in connection with sharing among scien-
tists recur when access is sought for purposes of litigation.
There is broad expressed support for data sharing. A 1985
study by the National Academy of Sciences concluded with a
number of recommendations, of which the first was: "Sharing
data should be a regular practice. ' 138 Such sharing furthers the
goals of science by affording opportunities for a variety of fur-
ther uses of the data. Needless to say, where sharing obviates
costly data collection by later researchers, it saves scientists time
and money. Among other things, sharing also allows reanalysis
that can serve as verification of the original researcher's conclu-
sions.139 Moreover, with the emergence of computers to store
and retrieve data, sharing has in many instances become much
easier than it was when scientists used less sophisticated tech-
nology. 140 At least at the level of ideals, Snow's enthusiasm for
openness receives widespread support and benefits from en-
hanced technology.
There are counterpressures, however. One continuing source
of friction is the desire of some who fund research to keep the
results secret. Classified research strikes at the core of the tenet
that scientists should be able to build on the work of others.
Recently, for example, Stanford University sued a federal
agency when it awarded a research contract to another univer-
sity after Stanford refused to accept a requirement that agency
approval be required before any results could be published, and
s NATIONAL AcAD. PRESS, SHARING RESEARCH DATA 25 (S. Feinberg, M. Martin &
M. Straf eds. 1985).
119 Id. at 10.
140 See, e.g., Sterling & Weinkam, Sharing Scientific Data, 33 COMMUNICATIONS OF
ASS'N FOR COMPUTING MACHINERY 112, 113 (1990).
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a district judge decided in Stanford's favor."'1
Even where there are not outside restraints of this charac-
ter, nobody knows whether most scientists live up to their ide-
als. 42 Although some federal funding agencies have come to in-
sist increasingly on sharing, knowledgeable observers perceive a
decline in the willingness of scientists to share their data.14 3 In
large measure, this situation results from the reality that
"[s]haring data primarily benefits science and society; the costs
are borne mostly by the initial investigators."144
The costs that sharing can impose on the initial researcher
resemble the objections scientists have to turning over their data
through discovery. This overlap suggests a reason for some skep-
ticism about the scientists' objections; in resisting disclosure
scientists are to a certain extent resisting a central tenet of sci-
ence. It is certainly true that use of research data in litigation is
not one of the purposes for which scientists extol data sharing.
Litigants like the tobacco companies cannot easily claim to be
anxious to further the goals of science when they seek data
through discovery. Thus, there is at least the prospect of some
reciprocal advantage for the scientist who shares data; she may
later get some in return. As a result, the costs tend to look quite
different from the vantage point of science.
Worse yet, as Mt. Sinai urged in American Tobacco, some
litigants seem to have purposefully pursued a course of conduct
that contradicts the goals of science by refusing to reveal the
results of research they commissioned,'4 5 and by organizing a
1I Board of Trustees Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Sullivan, 19 Media L. Rep.
(BNA) 1345 (D.D.C. Sept. 26, 1991). See Perlman, Stanford Wins Censorship Case, S.F.
Chron., Sept. 27, 1991, at A3, col 3; Sturgess, Stanford Battles NIH Over Confidential-
ity Pledge, Legal Times, Feb. 18, 1991, at 12; Perlman, Stanford Sues Heart Agency
Over Contract, S.F. Chron., Oct. 30, 1990, at A2, col 4.
1,, See Agencies, Journals Set Some Rules, 248 SCmNCE 954 (1990) ('There are no
objective data on data sharing .... ).
14s See Data Sharing: A Declining Ethic?, 248 ScENcE 952 (1990).
14 SHARING RnsEARcH DATA, supra note 138, at 18.
145 See Appendix, supra note 56, at A848-51 (describing tobacco industry funding of
research whose results were not disclosed). The tobacco companies are hardly unique
offenders in this regard. According to reports, the companies that marketed asbestos
products recruited scientists to study risks of the product but hushed up the results of
the study. Consider the following description of a 1952 conference on the dangers of
asbestos:
If a significant number of the fifty-odd medical doctors who attended the
Seventh Symposium had spoken out or had insisted that its papers and discus-
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campaign of scientific misinformation to discredit scientists
whose research revealed the hazards of smoking.146 Since a re-
searcher may legitimately balk at turning over data to one who
lacks the competence or inclination to use it properly, resisting
such malign forces may seem, to the researcher, to be entirely
consistent with generally endorsing data sharing to further the
interests of science.
From the perspective of the litigation system, however, this
sions be made public, they might well have blown the lid off the asbestos
coverup and saved thousands of lives, untold pain and suffering, and millions
of dollars. Instead ... the conference simply marked the nadir of a year in
which the asbestos industry, with the tacit approval of its insurers, successfully
suppressed information about the most important industrial carcinogen the
world has ever known.
P. BRODEUR, supra note 50, at 179-80.
One reaction to this problem would be to condition discovery of research data on the
revelation of such industry research. In general, however, where the litigation has
erupted, such revelation may follow. In tobacco litigation, for example, it seems that
plaintiffs have already obtained much of such information from the tobacco companies
through discovery. See Appendix, supra note 56, at A913-39 (deposition of Dr. James
Mold, former assistant director of research of Liggett & Myers). Thus, Judge Sarokin
noted in a prominent tobacco case:
Plaintiff offered evidence demonstrating that adverse results generated by re-
search eventually conducted by the cigarette companies themselves were sup-
pressed and concealed. At least one scientist testified as to threats made to him
if he published his findings, and there was other evidence of attempts to sup-
press or coerce others.
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 683 F. Supp. 1487, 1491 (D.N.J. 1988).
14 See Cipollone, 683 F. Supp. at 1490:
Evidence presented by the plaintiff, particularly that contained in docu-
ments of the defendants themselves, indicates the development of a public re-
lations strategy aimed at combating the mounting adverse scientific reports re-
garding the dangers of smoking. The evidence indicates further that the
industry of which these defendants were and are a part entered into a sophisti-
cated conspiracy. The conspiracy was organized to refute, undermine, and neu-
tralize information coming from the scientific and medical community and, at
the same time, to confuse and mislead the consuming public in an effort to
encourage existing smokers to continue and new persons to commence
smoking.
In this regard plaintiff has presented evidence, again, mainly from the files
of the defendants themselves, which demonstrates a deliberate intent and pur-
pose to challenge all adverse medical and scientific evidence regarding smok-
ing, irrespective of its truth or validity. Indeed, the strategy to meet the claims
of the scientific community was formulated before the contents of the scientific
evidence were known. Defendants determined that if a report was publicized
which demonstrated the dangers of cigarette smoking, attempts would be made
to offset it, and even attack the qualifications of the researcher, if necessary.
The asbestos industry similarly tried to discredit scientific reports on the dangers of the
product. See P. BRODEUR, supra note 50, at 124-27.
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scruple is not persuasive. Almost nobody is pleased to be on the
receiving end of nonparty discovery. Whether or not scientists
believe use of data in litigation is a valid reason for access, where
the data appear important to proper resolution of the litigation,
it is fundamental to the whole idea of discovery that access be
allowed. So the analogy from litigation to ordinary data sharing
among scientists will be a strong one for judges. They will also
be concerned that scientists' revulsion at litigants like the to-
bacco companies could color their research practices and conclu-
sions. Even scientists recognize this problem:
Many scientists take an activist role in various issues and some may
use their position and acknowledged expertise to present findings that
are relevant to a contentious public issue. But sometimes conclusions
publicized by scientists who also play a role as advocates, rest on stub-
born belief rather than acceptable analysis of data."7
Hence the problems caricatured in Scenario A may be most se-
vere in such cases; thus may Dr. Humanitarian turn into Dr.
Crackpot.148 Faced with such a possibility, a judge will be impa-
tient with the scientist's argument that use of data in litigation
is not as valid as use in science.
B. Scientists' Proprietary Interests
One type of concern courts should consider when research
data are sought can be labeled proprietary interests. In one
sense, these might include protection of financial gain that could
flow from disclosures.149 This concern was the stimulus behind
amended Rule 45, which is addressed to the problem of the
"drafted expert." 150 Where an expert is compelled by discovery
to use her expertise to provide an opinion for litigation, forceful
arguments that there has been a taking can be made.151 But
M Sterling & Weinkam, supra note 140, at 118.
I'l Recall that even Dr. Selikoff might be perceived as a crusader. See text accompa-
nying notes 67-68 supra.
149 Cf. Data Sharing, supra note 143, at 952 (boom in commercial biotechnology
prompted efforts to guard data to capitalize on its value in the marketplace).
I Thus, the advisory committee's notes explain that the rule as amended "provide3
appropriate protection for the intellectual property of the non-party witneM."
151 See, e.g., Plummer v. RH. Macy & Co., 69 A.D.2d 765, 414 N.Y.S.2d 921 (1st
Dep't 1979) (doctor subpoenaed to testify after refusing to provide medical report for
free). See generally Gelfand, "Taking" Informational Property Through Discouery, 66
WAsH. UL.Q. 703 (1988) (characterizing discovery as an unconstitutional taking where
1991]
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
these concerns are not analogous to the situation presented here;
a subpoena could not be used to force Dr. Selikoff to undertake
the study he actually made if he in fact had chosen not to pur-
sue it. When Mt. Sinai invoked the New York rule that an ex-
pert could not be compelled to render an opinion in American
Tobacco, the court properly rejected it.152 Far from asking Dr.
Selikoff to prepare or render an opinion, the tobacco companies
were seeking data because he had already given his opinion, and
they wanted to be able to argue that this opinion should be
qualified or rejected.
In a related vein, where scientific research has a market
value, protection may be warranted, and a taking argument
could be made if protection were not forthcoming. Even where
that argument can be made, however, use of the fruits of such
research in court may give rise to the risks presented in Scenario
A since the Dr. Crackpots of this world may premise peculiar
opinions on the research. 153 More often, however, Scenario A will
not involve this concern, and it was not involved in American
Tobacco. Certainly Mt. Sinai was not resisting discovery because
it hoped to market Dr. Selikoff's data for a profit. That would
hardly jibe with the academic freedom mantle it assumed in
support of its request for a researcher's privilege; researchers do
not oppose discovery because they want to use the data to make
money.
Thus, the conventional proprietary interest thrust of
amended Rule 45 misses the mark for the situations that con-
cern us. Instead, the focus in such cases will be on what might
be called a scholarly proprietary interest. This is more in tune
with science's longstanding goals: Scientists who have labori-
ously gathered data have a legitimate interest in mining the data
for insights. Anyone who has been involved in American higher
education will know that recognition flows to those who publish
while others perish. Not surprisingly, exactly this concern has
been cited as a reason scientists will not share data freely with
the party required to provide information is in the business of selling such information
and the party seeking discovery ordinarily would have to pay to obtain the information
in the marketplace).
12 880 F.2d at 1528-30.
"83 A possible example is presented by the use of DNA typing for identification in
criminal cases. See note 173 infra.
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other scientists."" To take away this incentive by granting
others access via litigation could seriously erode the motivation
to undertake thorough data collection. 1e
But this scholarly proprietary interest can easily be taken
too far. It is one thing to afford the initial researcher a good first
chance to mine the data. Particularly given the prospect that
other insights could be gleaned from the data,150 however, it is
quite another to give the initial researcher a permanent veto on
access, at least where access is legitimately needed for use in liti-
gation. Purely in terms of science, the penchant for secrecy of
some scientists can be criticized. Scientific journals often insist
that data and conclusions be kept under wraps until published
in articles, but some scientists have begun to question these de-
lays in the release of information. 57 The justification offered for
continued secrecy is that peer review is necessary to scrutinize
'work before it is reported and that premature release of possibly
unfounded conclusions would be dangerous. But some suggest
that insistence on delay is unjustified and that it partly serves to
increase the profits of the journals. 1 8 Resolving this debate is
well beyond the scope of this Article, but the fact that it is oc-
curring indicates that courts should be uneasy about leaving the
timing of access entirely to scientists in the thrall of scientific
journals.
At the least, once the research results are published this
154 Clubb, Austin, Geda & Traugott, Sharing Research Data in the Social Sciences,
in SHARING REsEARCH DATA, supra note 138, at 39, 69 ("[R]esearchers place such a high
premium on being the first to publish a particular finding and are in such competition
with each other to do so that most would be unwilling to make basic research data avail-
able to other potentially competitive researchers."); see also A. KoHN, supra note 25, at 5
("Scientists seek recognition: they want to publish and to see their names in print; they
wish to be recognized by their fellow scientists .... Scientists fight fiercely for priority
of their discoveries.").
155 See SHARMG RESEARCH DATA, supra note 138, at 26:
Analyzing data and reporting discoveries are clearly more glamorous tasks
to many scientists than collecting data. The motivation of possible discoveries
is needed even to contemplate data collection, and science is served well by
this motivation. Thus, initial investigators are entitled to be the first to ex-
amine, summarize, and analyze their data.
0 See text accompanying notes 176-77 infra.
157 See Altman, With Lives At Stake, Issue Is Secrecy of Data, N.Y. Times, Jan. 15,
1991, at C3, col 1.
I" See id. ("One area of contention is that embargoes have helped scientific journals
reap large profits.").
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proprietary rights argument would have minimal force.159 In
American Tobacco, for example, Dr. Selikoff's studies were
ongoing but his articles had already been in the literature for
almost two decades. Insistence on access to the data underlying
published conclusions accords with the policy of some scientific
journals that data underlying published conclusions be made
available.'6 0 Where publication has not yet occurred but is con-
templated, more circumspection is in order. If there is no pros-
pect of further publication, however, the mere desire of the re-
searcher to keep data under wraps seems entitled to little
weight.' In sum, as the scientific community's endorsement of
data sharing suggests, the proprietary interests of the researcher
have very limited force as to research data on which published
results are based.
C. Burden
Quite different concerns are pertinent where compliance
with the subpoena will be an onerous task; such problems are a
central feature of Scenario B. As an initial matter, indications
that the subpoena is designed to harass the scientist or impede
research provide strong reasons for quashing it. The Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure direct the judge to limit discovery that
is unduly burdensome and suggest that indications of harass-
ment are pertinent to that question; 6 2 surely amended Rule 45
calls for such treatment. Besides the breadth of the subpoena,
indications that the party really has little need for the informa-
tion in connection with the lawsuit6 3 suggest that there may be
some such malign purpose. Cases in which courts find that dis-
19 It is worth noting here that it is likely that publication will usually be essential
to show a need for access. See text accompanying notes 179-80 infra.
160 See Sharing Research Data, 24 MED. CARE 879, 879 (1986) ("It is the expectation
of the editors that the authors of papers published in MEDICAL CARE will allow access to
their data."); see also SHARING RESEARCH DATA, supra note 138, at 31 ("Recommendation
13. Journals should strongly encourage authors to make detailed data accessible to other
researchers.").
161 Note that more difficult problems are presented when the researcher has not
published anything, and perhaps has aborted the data-collection effort. These circum.
stances bear directly on the need for access, see text accompanying notes 179-80 inlra,
but might be said to impinge on the scholarly proprietary interest if disclosure of the
research would somehow embarrass the researcher.
162 See FED. R. Cim. P. 26(b)(1), 26(g)(2).
163 See text accompanying notes 171-83 infra for discussion of need for access.
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covery has been pursued for an ulterior motive and impose sanc-
tions reflect such an evaluation. 16
The fact that the litigant has served a blunderbuss sub-
poena does not compel a finding of abuse, however. As the Sev-
enth Circuit explained in Deitchman:
Such a sweeping subpoena means about as much as the asking price
for a rug in an Oriental bazaar. It is normally just a means of opening
discussion between discoverer and discoveree. The discoverer asks for
too much because he is not, until he is told, aware of the discoveree's
problems. When a court is confronted with a motion to quash such a
subpoena, its duty is not to deny any discovery, but to reduce the
demand to what is reasonable, considering the discoverer's needs and
the discoveree's problems.8 8
Ordinarily, the focus is therefore on narrowing the subpoena, not
forbidding discovery altogether.""8
A court confronted with burden arguments by a scientist
should implement the cost/benefit approach generally applicable
to discovery. As it does so, it may refer as well to what might
reasonably be expected of scientists outside the discovery con-
text, keeping in mind the push for data sharing as an ethic of
science. In the scientific community researchers are encouraged
to design their procedures to facilitate such sharing. Thus, the
National Academy of Sciences study urged that accommodation
of data sharing be built into research programs.6e To implement
this proposal, the study suggested further that grant applica-
tions include in the budget a component for the costs associated
with data sharing, and that granting agencies take account of
that cost in making awards.168 The prospect of subpoenas may
prompt further foresight. For example, one researcher reacted to
164 E.g., Appeal of Licht & Semonoff, 796 F.2d 564, 567 (1st Cir. 1986) (Deposition
answers were used in proxy fight; court imposed sanctions because lavyer'es "primary
purpose" was "to gain information to disseminate to shareholders, not to advance the
legal action.").
,m 740 F.2d at 560.
1 8 Consistent with this focus, in many districts the parties are required to meet to
resolve or narrow discovery disputes before bringing discovery motions before the court.
E.g., N.D. Cal. Local Rule 230-4(a) ("The court will entertain no motion pursuant to
Rules 26 through 37.. . unless counsel shall have previously conferred concerning all
disputed issues.").
167 See SHARING REsEARCH DATA, supra note 138, at 27 ("Recommendation 4. Plans
for data sharing should be an integral part of a research plan whenever data sharing is
feasible.").
1" Id. at 29.
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American Tobacco by suggesting that, if it will be important to
remove identifiers to protect the confidentiality of subjects, the
identifiers should be removed at the outset to avoid a heavy bur-
den later should there be a subpoena." 9 In other contexts, courts
have been skeptical about discovery burdens that seem to result
from the record-keeping practices of the party resisting discov-
ery,17 0 and the practices of the scientific community seem rele-
vant to assessing burden arguments by researchers.
Courts will have to proceed sensibly in this area. American
Tobacco illustrates the kind of accommodation that is possible.
Initially the tobacco companies sought a much broader array of
data than they asked for in their later federal subpoenas. Dr.
Selikoff responded by asserting that it would take him
thousands of hours to redact this large volume of material to
protect the confidentiality of research subjects. Eventually, the
court ordered production of computer-readable materials that
could be stripped of identifiers with relative ease, and the bur-
den issue essentially dropped out of the dispute.
D. Need for Access
The hallmark of a qualified privilege is focus on the discov-
ering party's need for access to the material claimed to be privi-
leged. Amended Rule 45 similarly relies on the analogous show-
ing of need required for discovery of work product. 7 1 That does
"I9 See Holder, supra note 47. Thus, in discussing proper procedures for Institu-
tional Review Boards (IRB), which approve research on human subjects (see 45 C.F.R. §
46.102(h) (1981)), Holder suggests as follows:
Where a protocol indicates that identifiers are going to be removed from data
sheets, the IRB should insist that such removals be done as the data are accu-
mulated. The researchers should not be permitted to gather all the data and
then, years after the first subject was contacted, remove all the identifiers at
one time. The time and effort to be spent doing so after a subpoena has been
received may be so great as to disrupt many people's lives.
Holder, supra note 47, at 9.
170 E.g., Kozlowski v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 73 F.R.D. 73 (D. Mass. 1976), in which
defendant asserted that responding to plaintiff's discovery would be "the equivalent of
an impossible task." The court ordered discovery nevertheless, reasoning that "[tihe de-
fendant may not excuse itself from compliance with Rule 34, Fed. R. Civ. P., by utilizing
a system of record-keeping which conceals rather than discloses relevant records." Id, at
76.
171 The advisory committee notes to amended Rule 45 explain that the need require-
ment it imposes "is the same as that necessary to secure work product under Rule
26NW(3."
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not mean, however, that need will rarely be demonstrated, at
least in regard to data upon which published studies are based.
As Judge Weinstein has observed, in mass tort cases "epidemio-
logic studies on causation assume a role of critical impor-
tance."'7 2 More generally, where a researcher's conclusions will
be relied upon by witnesses at trial, as in American Tobacco,
there are strong reasons for allowing reasonable access to the
data on which they are based.173 We have already seen such a
situation; in Deitchman the Seventh Circuit directed access to
ongoing research materials because otherwise the defendant
would be unable to challenge the researcher's published conclu-
sions.'74 As a counterpoint to this need factor, some courts have
denied discovery of research data on the strength of assurances
that the research conclusions will not be used at trial.
Somewhat different issues arise when the party seeking dis-
27 In re Agent Orange Prods. Liab. Lit., 611 F. Supp. 1223, 1239 (E.D.N.Y. 1985),
aff'd, 818 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1987), cert, denied, 487 U.S. 1234 (1988).
173 See Graham, Expert Witness Testimony and the Federal Rules of Evidence:
Insuring Adequate Assurance of Trustworthiness, 1986 U. ILL. L. REv. 43, 78-84. Profes-
sor Graham discusses the general problem of the "second tier expert," the person whose
out-of-court opinion forms the basis for the in-court opinion testified to by another ex-
pert. He concludes that the opposing party needs "full discovery of the second tier ex-
pert" because, "[t]o effectively cross-examine the testifying expert, the attorney may
have to dispute the facts, data, or opinions on which the testifying expert bases his or
her opinion." Id. at 79; see also Kaplan & Cogan, supra note 90, at 223-24.
Comparable problems can arise in connection with determining whether to allow
new scientific methods to serve as the basis for opinion testimony in court. The most
prominent current example is the increasing popularity of DNA "typing" as a means of
identification in criminal cases. Those challenging the reliability of such techniques have
had difficulty obtaining information for use in court due to trade secret claims, which are
another form of proprietary interest
Efforts to evaluate scientific acceptance of a particular implementation of
DNA typing technology may be hindered, however, by the desire of commercial
laboratories to keep their laboratory protocols confidential in order to protect
alleged trade secrets.... Only two small groups of scientists have actually
reviewed these procedures: those chosen and approved by the companies them-
selves and a handful of independent experts retained by parties against whom
DNA evidence has been offered (who have obtained the laboratory protocols
by subpoena or court order). The independent experts have typically been
bound by court order not to disclose any of the confidential information or
make any public comment on it. Hence, the procedures employed by these
companies are shielded from scrutiny by the scientific community at large.
Thompson & Ford, DNA Typing: Acceptance and Weight of the New Genetic Identifi-
cation Tests, 75 V. L. REv. 45, 59-60 (1989).
174 See text accompanying note 74 supra.
175 E.g., Apicella v. McNeil Laboratories, Inc., 66 F.R.D. 78, 84-86 (E.D.N.Y. 1975);
Plough, Inc. v. National Academy of Sciences, 530 A.2d 1152 (D.C. 1987).
1991]
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
covery wants to go beyond the published conclusions and delve
into new areas unexplored by the original researcher. In Ameri-
can Tobacco, for example, Mt. Sinai stressed that much of the
data sought by early subpoenas had not been relied upon by Dr.
Selikoff in his published studies. Purely as a matter of admissi-
bility, an expert need not agree with another researcher's con-
clusions derived from certain data to rely on such data while tes-
tifying.176 Moreover, "[t]he research potential of a well-designed
data collection is rarely exhausted by the original data collector,
and data collections usually have value beyond those for which
they were originally designed. 1 7 In American Tobacco for ex-
ample, the tobacco companies asserted that one reason they
wanted access to the data was to perform more refined analyses
that had not been possible under the computer technology avail-
able at the time Dr. Selikoff performed his studies.
This possibility of mining the data for other purposes might
unduly intrude on the scholar's proprietary interest in a fair
chance to be the first to announce the discoveries that can be
derived from her data. In American Tobacco, this concern
seemed fairly weak given the time lag since Dr. Selikoff's last
publication and the relative indistinctness of his ongoing re-
search interests. Moreover, where a litigant can show specific ap-
plications to this litigation that could result from alternative
analyses of the data, it would seem that a researcher relying on
this proprietary interest could be expected to indicate whether
she intends to perform the same analyses. If not, the proprietary
interest concern abates. If so, the court might well be able to
await the completion of that analysis.178
178 Again, Bendectin provides an example. In DeLuca v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuti-
cals, Inc., 911 F.2d 941 (3d Cir. 1990), a plaintiff's expert witness sought to premise his
opinion that Bendectin could cause birth defects on data that reached other conclusions.
The district court refused to allow such testimony even though the data was largely the
same as that relied upon by defendant's expert for a reverse conclusion. The appellate
court reversed:
Implicit in the district court's decision ... is the principle that (Federal]
Rule [of Evidence] 703 requires an expert to accept the conclusions reached by
the authors of studies if the expert wishes to utilize the data underlying those
studies as a basis for testimony. However, the Federal Rules of Evidence con-
tain no requirement that an expert's testimony be based upon reasoning sub.
jected to peer review and published in the professional literature.
Id. at 954.
177 Clubb, Austin, Geda & Traugott, supra note 154, at 45.
178 This situation would not be akin to the "drafted expert" problem that would
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The difficulty with this analysis is that it could become a
slippery slope toward routinely allowing access to uncompleted
research not otherwise pertinent to the litigation. Sliding too far
down this slope brings into play the risks caricatured in Scenario
B in which a subpoena seriously disrupts scientific research
while it is in progress. Our starting point was that discovery
should be allowed despite the risks of Scenario B to enable the
litigation system to react to the risks of Scenario A. But those
risks disappear if the research won't have any bearing on the
litigation unless discovery is allowed. Consistent with the cases
that deny discovery if the research results will not be offered at
trial,17 9 the normal response should probably be to deny discov-
ery unless the party makes an extraordinary showing that the
data is likely to produce important information bearing on im-
portant issues in the case, and that no alternative source of data
exists. 80
This analysis bears on the other factor pertinent under
amended Rule 45-whether this need can be satisfied in some
way other than by ordering discovery. In the "drafted expert"
situation, the question would be whether the subpoenaed expert
is unique, and the normal assumption would be that others
could be found. Similar arguments might be made about re-
search data. In American Tobacco, for example, Mt. Sinai ar-
gued that the tobacco companies should do their own research if
they wanted to make a showing about the relation between
smoking and exposure to asbestos in causing lung cancer.1 81 But
it is likely that, as the tobacco companies were able to do, par-
ties seeking discovery of the data underlying published results
will be able to show that replicating research is unduly costly
and time-consuming. More to the point, the "do it yourself" ar-
gument may often miss the mark because another study would
exist if one could by subpoena compel a researcher to undertake certain data gathering
and analysis. Here the assumption is that the researcher intends to perform the analysis,
and in that sense is a volunteer, although the subpoena may hurry that process up.
179 See note 175 supra.
280 In such instances, if the discovering party has itself done similar research, as was
evidently true of the tobacco companies (see note 145 supra), that fact would weigh
heavily against discovery.
181 Appendix, supra note 56, at A32 (Affidavit of Michael Cardozo, Mt. Sinai's coun-
sel) ("there is no reason why [R.J.] Reynolds could not have conducted its own studies
comparable to those undertaken by Dr. Selikoffr).
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not produce the substantial equivalent182 of the data underlying
the study that will be presented in court. If Dr. Selikoff's find-
ings are central to the underlying personal injury cases, his data
assume an importance that probably cannot be duplicated by
any other. As the Seventh Circuit put it, in that circumstance
the original researcher's data are "the most pertinent evi-
dence. ' 18 3 Thus, the need criterion is likely to satisfy the undue
hardship test as well.
E. Protecting Subjects' Confidentiality
In individual cases courts have to determine whether there
is a need for confidentiality to protect communications between
researchers and research subjects. Insistence that such confiden-
tiality is always needed may be too broad, whether or not a
pledge of confidentiality has been made.8 Nevertheless, even in
the absence of a pledge of confidentiality, it may often be true
that the nature of the information is such that confidentiality is
implicit. 185
If there is a ground for ensuring the subjects' confidentiality
in connection with certain research, the courts properly resist ef-
forts to broach that confidentiality. For example, Procter &
Gamble Co., a defendant in a number of toxic shock syndrome
(TSS) cases, sought discovery of the identities of subjects in a
study done by the Center for Disease Control that linked TSS to
182 This idea is drawn from Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(3) ("the party is
unable without undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by
other means").
283 740 F.2d 556, 561 (7th Cir. 1984). See text accompanying note 74 supra.
I" See text accompanying note 132 supra; but see Richards of Rockford, Inc. v.
Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 71 F.R.D. 388, 390 (N.D. Cal. 1976) ("Much of the raw data on
which research is based simply is not available except upon a pledge of confidentiality.
Compelled disclosure of confidential information would without question severely stifle
research into questions of public policy, the very subjects in which the public interest is
greatest.").
In this connection, note that the requirements for funding of research on human
subjects by the Department of Health and Human Services include assuring that
"[w]here appropriate, there are adequate provisions to protect the privacy of subjects
and to maintain the confidentiality of data." 45 C.F.R. § 46.111(a)(7) (1981) (emphasis
added).
'85 See Farnsworth v. Procter & Gamble Co., 758 F.2d 1545, 1547 (11th Cir. 1985)
("Even without an express guarantee of confidentiality there is still an expectation, not
unjustified, that when highly personal and potentially embarrassing information is given
for the sake of medical research, it will remain private.").
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one of Procter & Gamble's tampons. The plaintiffs intended to
introduce the study at the trial, and the defendant wanted to
know the identities of the subjects to investigate the methodol-
ogy used in the study. This argument for revelation of the iden-
tity of research subjects could presumably be made routinely, 86
but the court rejected it, maintaining confidentiality of the sub-
jects and noting the intensely personal and intimate nature of
the information in the study.18 7
This sort of treatment does not require that there be a priv-
ilege. A prime example is provided by suits against providers of
blood brought by people who claim that they contracted AIDS
due to blood transfusions. Seeking to prove that blood banks
have been negligent in screening donors, plaintiffs in such cases
seek the identity of donors through discovery. Without inquiring
into privilege, a number of courts refuse such discovery to avoid
the risk that disclosure would deter blood donations even
though the discovery in these cases is sought from the defend-
ant.188 In the same vein, courts generally have allowed redaction
of identifying information from research data. 8 9 In American
Tobacco there was a debate between the tobacco companies and
Mt. Sinai about how complete this redaction should be,'00 but
I" Note that the argument would only work if the research results themselves are
before discovery likely to be involved in the litigation. As we have seen (see text accom-
panying notes 179-80 supra) unless that is true, it will be difficult for a party to justify
discovery. Such a party would be hard put to argue simultaneously that the data were a
unique resource and that it needs to know the identities of the research subjects to show
that the data collection was not done properly.
I" Farnsworth v. Procter & Gamble Co., 758 F.2d 1545 (11th Cir. 1985); see also
Lampshire v. Procter & Gamble Co., 94 F..D. 58 (N.D. Ga. 1982).
I" E.g., Coleman v. American Red Cross, 130 F.P.D. 360 (E.D. Mich. 1990); Doe v.
American Red Cross Blood Servs., 125 F.R.D. 646 (D.S.C. 1989); see Note, Transfusion-
Related AIDS Litigation: Permitting Limited Discouery from Blood Donors in Single
Donor Cases, 76 ComRuL. L REv. 927 (1991).
19 E.g., Phillips v. Medtronic, Inc., 130 F.R.D. 136 (D. Kan. 1990); Kennedy v. Con-
necticut, 115 F.I.D. 497, 501 (D. Conn. 1987); Harris v. Upjohn Co., 115 F.R.D. 191 (S.D.
I1. 1987); cf. Newsom v. Breon Labs., Inc., 709 S.W.2d 559 (Tenn. 1986) (court directs
that identity of patients allegedly harmed by drug be withheld, but that their doctors'
names may be revealed).
190 Mt. Sinai argued that the counties of residence and union local data be removed,
and that birth and death dates should be summarized by decade, contending that other-
wise the tobacco companies could figure out who certain research aubjects were. The
district court, however, directed only that the names, social security numbers, street ad-
dresses and union registration numbers be redacted, and enjoined any efforts to ascer-
tain the identities of the subjects. Noting the threat of sanctions for any violation of the
protective order, the Second Circuit affirmed. See 880 F.2d at 1530.
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there was little concern with the basic principle that some pro-
tection for confidentiality was in order.
F. Cost
Hand in hand with the burden question comes the issue of
cost. By avoiding burdensome methods of access to the data,
courts (and litigants) can minimize the cost to the researcher of
complying with a subpoena. But significant costs may neverthe-
less be incurred in some cases. Who should bear them?
The litigation system is often indifferent to costs, but with
nonparties it can shift the costs to those who undertook discov-
ery, sometimes rather spectacularly.191 Where expert opinions
are generated for litigation, the federal rules prescribe sharing of
the cost of research on which the expert opinion is based in
some cases.192 In this way, litigants are prevented from getting a
free ride on the case preparation activities of their adversaries.
How do these principles apply to the unaffiliated re-
searcher? This person is not gathering data at the behest of a
litigant, and the provisions for shifting that cost therefore do not
apply; Mt. Sinai is not permitted to shift part of the cost of Dr.
Selikoff's research to the tobacco companies. But that says little
about the power of the court to require reimbursement for the
additional costs resulting from compliance with the discovery.
Some courts have questioned this power,19 3 but amended Rule
45 makes it explicit by directing that "the person to whom the
subpoena is addressed will be reasonably compensated" for the
burden imposed.19 4 The cost issue should therefore present only
a limited problem in 'the future.
191 See United States v. CBS, Inc., 103 F.R.D. 365 (C.D. Cal. 1984) (defendants that
subpoenaed nonparties were ordered to reimburse them for over $760,000 for costs they
incurred in complying with the subpoenas).
19 FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(C) (party seeking discovery must pay opposing party "a
fair portion of the fees and expenses reasonably incurred by the latter party in obtaining
facts and opinions").
19 See In re Snyder, 115 F.R.D. 211, 214-15 (D. Ariz. 1987) (suggesting that because
unaffiliated witness was not covered under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(4),
there may be no power to direct reimbursement for the costs of complying with the
discovery).
"" FED. R. Civ. P. 45(c)(3)(B).
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CONCLUSION
This Article began on a rather high plane, but seems to have
descended to minutiae by the end. It would be comforting to be
able to announce a resolution of the tension between litigation
and science, or at least the elimination of potential threats to
science by discovery. Some reforms may indeed curtail resolu-
tion of issues of science by the adversary trial method,"", but it
would be foolhardy to forecast that the risk of misinterpretation
or misuse of science in the courtroom will soon end. Moreover,
given the divergent orientations of science and litigation, it is
not at all clear that such a forecast would be entirely optimistic
from the perspective of litigation, much as it might be welcome
to science. Accurate though Huber's description of the scientific
method may be, it is not necessarily the best way to resolve dis-
putes. As a consequence, litigation will still be beset by the
problems in Scenario A, and courts will have to adopt measures
to guard against such miscues.
Discovery is the customary protection in the adversarial
world of litigation, for it equips litigants with knowledge to re-
but propositions offered against them. Discovery calculated to
avoid Scenario A frequently will focus on background data, but
may raise the risks described in Scenario B where the data be-
longs to an unaffiliated scientist. Much as that scientist might
prefer to be a conscientious objector to litigation, where her con-
clusions are going to be before the court litigation is likely to
demand access to backup material. In doing so, it somewhat mir-
rors the attitude of science toward favoring access to underlying
data to permit evaluation of published propositions. Although
litigation is not the forum C.P. Snow had in mind, it is hard to
justify shutting the door to litigation if it is open to science.
Hence this Article has concluded that the task of accommo-
dating litigation and science in the discovery context will have to
turn on the minutiae of individual circumstances rather than a
global solution. Even if there were a basis for creating a re-
searcher's privilege, it would be qualified and would lead to a
comparable result. In concluding, the Article has therefore cata-
logued and evaluated the pertinent interests that should apply
under amended Rule 45. Against the background of openness in
"I See, e.g., note 41 supra.
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science, the proprietary interests of scholars should ordinarily
guarantee them first crack at publishing the results of their re-
search but should not have significant weight when their pub-
lished conclusions are to be presented in court. Scientists' con-
cerns about burden deserve a sympathetic ear, like all concerns
about burden in discovery, but ordinarily they should be solved
by allowing reasonable access to data for which there is a genu-
ine need. Matters of confidentiality and cost similarly appear
susceptible to relatively simple and sensible solution in ordinary
cases. The heart of the debate therefore should be about the
need for the data, and there the primary focus will be on
whether the researcher's work will, in effect, be in the courtroom
absent discovery. If it will, access is in order, as the courts have
often directed. Science has survived, and will continue to sur-
vive, this inconvenience.
